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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I L:tlNG DIAMOND OIL CORPORATION, 
tormerly known as FLYING DIAMOND 
c.ul<POAATION, a Utah corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
NEWTON SHEEP COMPANY, a limited 
~artnership; RALPH M. NEWTON, 
EUGENE B. NEWTON and SCOTT F. 
NEWTON, general partners; and 
EUGENE B. NEWTON, individually, 
and EDNA ELLIOTT NEWTON, 
his wife, 
and 
Defendants-
Responden ts. 
BASS ENTERPRISES PRODUCTION CO., 
a Texas corporation, 
Intervenor 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
Case No. 19178 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The owner of a severed oil and gas title covenanted to 
pay the surface owner amounts equal to 2 1/2% of the value of 
the oil and gas produced from the property, the covenant being 
made in consideration of the surface owner's grant of oil and 
gas operating easements; the case involves conflicting claims 
upon the benefit of the covenant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER LOURT 
The lower court decreed that the defendant-respondent 
parties are entitled to spec ific>d fr act ions of the "moneys pa t,J 
heretofore and hereafter" by reason of the covc>nant, and 
granted them money judgments against appellant for past 
payments made to appellant by the oil and gas owner. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks vacation of the lower court's 
judgment, and a remand with directions for entry of a judgment 
declaring that appellant holds the entire benefit of the 
covenant and its proceeds. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Preliminary Statement 
This appeal is taken from the adjudication of one 
count of a five-count complaint. The complaint, filed by 
appellant Flying Diamond Oil Corporation ("Flying Diamond") 
seeks declaratory relief to construe a contract covering its 
purchase of a sheep ranch property from the respondent Newton 
parties ("the Newtons"). Respondent Bass Enterprises 
Production Company ("Bass") intervened as to Count I only. By 
agreement of the parties and upon the trial court's order, 
Count I was bifurcated and tried separately. The other counts 
remain pending in the court below. 
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In Count I Fl;ing Diamond seeks a declaratory judgment 
: 01.;t, notwithstanding the Newtons' contrary demands, Flying 
'11amond is -=ntitled to all benefits of a covenant made by 
,·hamplin Petroleum Company ("Champlin") to make payments equal 
to 2 1/2% of the value of oil and gas production from certain 
sections of the ranch property. Flying Diamond, the owner of 
the surface, claims ownership of the covenant benefits as 
successor surface owner in accordance with the terms of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement in which the covenant was made. By 
counterclaim and cross-claim, the Newtons and Bass assert 
fractional interests in the covenant and the payments by virtue 
of royalty conveyances made before Flying Diamond acquired its 
surface ownership. 
The appeal requires the construction of three 
conveyances. The factual title history is not disputed, and 
the summary in this brief refers to the Clerk's record with the 
notation "R _____ _ The sum.~ary of the trial evidence is 
supported by reference to the reporter's transcript, shown 
below as "Tr {Throughout the transcript, the word 
"surface" appears as "service"; it is believed that formal 
corrections are not necessary as the intention of the speaker 
is clear enough from the context). 
General Title Chronology 
The conveyances requiring construction are the Surface 
Owner's Agreement (dated in 1971) which created the 2 1/2% 
-3-
covenant interest, a mineral Deed (1972), and a Ranch Purchas,o 
Contract (1974). Each of these affects the mineral or surface 
title to the former Newton Sheep Ranch, a property of about 
20,000 acres situated in Summit County. 
About half of the Ranch consists of "railroad" 
sections. These, typically, are the odd-numbered sections 
which were patented to Union Pacific Railroad Company under the 
congressional land grants in aid of railroad construction. The 
history of those railroad sections involved in this case is 
that Union Pacific sold the surface to ranchers, retained the 
minerals thereunder, and later transferred the oil and gas 
title to Champlin, its oil and gas subsidiary (R 278). The 
even-numbered sections comprising the balance of the Ranch are 
the so-called "fee" sections (about 9,300 acres} and in these, 
typically, the rancher held both the surface and the mineral 
title. 
For some years before the execution of the Surface 
Owner's Agreement, the surface title to the Ranch was held by 
Hyrum J. Newton & Sons Sheep Company (the "Newton Company"). 
The Newton Company also held the mineral title in the fee 
sections. The severed oil and gas title in the railroad 
sections was held by Champlin (R 27B}. The Surface Owner's 
Agreement, executed in September 1971 between the Newton 
Company and Champlin, covered six of the railroad sections (R 
278-9; Exh. 1 at R 285). 
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Later in 1971 the Newton Company's interest in the 
~anch was transferred to a family limited partnership, 
irrellant Newton Sheep Company ("Newton Sheep") (R 279). 
A transaction in February 1972 between Newton Sheep 
and Bass resulted in execution of a Deed conveying to Bass one 
half of the minerals in the fee lands, and one half of any 
royalty to which Newton Sheep was entitled in the railroad 
sections (R 279; Exh. 2 at R 293). 
In 1974, Flying Diamond bought a major part of the 
Ranch from Newton Sheep under the Ranch Purchase Contract (R 
279; Exh. 3 at R 298). As to the portion so acquired, the 
Contract granted to Flying Diamond the full surface title, 
one-half of any mineral rights still held in the fee lands, and 
one-half the royalty owned by Newton Sheep in the railroad 
sections. 
After Flying Diamond's ranch acquisition, oil and gas 
discoveries were made by Champlin within certain of the 
railroad sections which are subject to all three coveyances: 
the Surface Owner's Agreement, the Newton-Bass Deed, and the 
Ranch Purchase Contract (R 279). 
Flying Diamond acquired the Ranch surface in 1974, 
before any oil discovery, and since the beginning of production 
Champlin has remitted to Flying Diamond monthly cash payments 
equal to 2 1/2% of oil and gas sales proceeds (R 279) , and 
continues to do so. (Pursuant to agreement among the parties, 
Flying Diamond is forwarding three-fourths of the monthly 
remittances, as they are received, to be held by an escrow 
agent until the case is resolved). 
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A summary of the conveyances follows; 
Surface Owner's Agreement, dated September 24, 1971. 
between the Newton Company, as Land Owner, and Champlin (Exh. 
at R 476-83). By this agreement, the Land Owner grants to 
Champlin easements to enter upon the surface, to drill, and to 
maintain specified surface "facilities" convenient to 
Champlin's oil and gas operations. In consideration, Champlin 
covenants (1) to make payments in cash equal to 2 1/2% of the 
value of oil and gas produced and marketed; (2) to pay rentals 
measured by the agricultural value of such surface as may be 
taken up in related unit operations; and (3) to pay for all 
damages to the surface and improvements. The agreement 
provides that no other payments shall be due the surface owner. 
Section 7 provides that the three payment covenants 
are covenants "running with the surface ownership"; that they 
shall not be held, or transferred, separately from the surface 
ownership; and that the payments will be paid to the person or 
persons owning the surface at the time an individual payment 
becomes due, and to the subsequent surface owners, upon a title 
showing. Section 8 provides that the surface easements are 
appurtenant to the mineral title, and will bind the surface and 
all present and future surface owners. The agreement has an 
indefinite term, typical in oil and gas conveyancing: one year 
and so long thereafter as the oil and gas title is committed to 
a lease or a unit, or so long as production or operations 
continue. The agreement is assignable, subject, however, to 
-6-
rhe Section 7 provisions stating that the payment covenants are 
tnseparable from the surface ownership. 
The inseparability provisions of Section 7 are quoted 
and analyzed in Point I(b) of the Argument below. A copy of 
the Surface Owner's Agreement is included in this brief as 
Appendix A. 
Deed, dated February 1, 1972, made by Newton Sheep, as 
Granter, to Bass, as Grantee (Exh. 2 at R 484-8). Subparagraph 
A.l. of the Deed grants a one-half interest in the oil, gas and 
other minerals in specifically described "fee lands" (9,316 
acres); Subparagraph A.2., a catch-all clause, grants a like 
mineral interest in all of Grantor's fee lands within all 
affected townships. Subparagraph B.l., covering the railroad 
sections, conveys to Grantee " • one-half of the royalty (of 
any type) from production of minerals that the Grantor actually 
receives or is entitled to receive ••• • from the "Union 
Pacific Railroad Company Lands" (10,003 acres). Other 
provisions create for Bass a first right of purchase, a 
covenant of further assurances, and a warranty of title. 
Newton Sheep also makes two specific warranties concerning the 
so-called royalty interest which are discussed below. 
A copy of the Deed is included as Appendix B. 
The Newton Ranch Purchase Contract, dated April 12, 
1974, made between Newton Sheep, as Seller, and Flying Diamond, 
as Buyer (Exh. 3 at R 489-520). By the Contract, Flying 
Diamond acquired a warranted "full" surface title, one-half of 
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the 011, gas and otner ~1nerals then 0wne~ by SellQr 1n the fee 
lands, and one-half of the "roy3lt'/ (•)f anv typ'°I" in t.~P 
railroad lands to which SellPr is entitle~. Newtron Sheep als" 
makes the same two specific warranties concerning the royalty 
interest as were set out in the Bass Deed. 
Proceedings 
Before trial, Flying Diamond moved for partial summary 
judgment based on the theory that the Surface Owner's Agreement 
operates to vest all rights in the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant in Flying Diamond, as successor surface owner, as a 
matter of law. Bass also made a motion for summary judgment, 
its theory being that the Deed's grant to Bass of one-half of 
the "royalty (of any type)" in the railroad lands was a grant 
of one half of the 2 1/2% covenant interest. Both motions were 
denied. 
At trial, over Flying Diamond's objection, Bass and 
the Newtons introduced evidence to support their contention 
that the "royalty (of any type)" language in the Deed was 
intended to operate as a grant to Bass, and a reservation to 
Newton Sheep, of one-half each of the 2 1/2% covenant. William 
Collister, a Denver attorney retained by Bass to prepare the 
Deed, testified by deposition that subparagraph I.B. was 
intended to cover the royalty from production from the Union 
Pacific lands (Deposition of Collister (R 527), p. 21, line 25 
- p. 22, line 30), royalty meaning, in his use of the phrase, 
"the two and a half percent royalty in the surface owners 
8-
J<1ri?~ment. 11 (Deposition, p. 22, lines 24-25); see Tr 89 
r tritroduction of Collister deposition at trial}. 
~r. Collister further testified that he felt the words 
1f grant in the Deed were sufficient to convey property in Utah 
(Deposition, p. 34) and that: "And my deed paragraph A conveys 
minerals and paragraph B conveys royalty. And there is a 
distinction" (p. 49, lines 6-7). Asked whether those two basic 
kinds of interests (mineral and royalty} included all kinds, 
the witness said "No, there are other things in existence 
clearly. The contractual right to receive monies, you know." 
(p. 49, lines 22-24). 
With respect to the subject of a claimed estoppel of 
Flying Diamond, Scott Newton and Ralph Newton, general partners 
of Newton Sheep, testified that in the discussions preceding 
the sale of the Ranch in 1974, they advised Flying Diamond of 
Newton Sheep's earlier sale of one-half of the 2 1/2% payable 
in the railroad sections (Tr 64, 80) and that, having sold 
one-half to Bass, they (Flying Diamond} "would take a quarter 
of what was left of the half, and we would keep a quarter." 
(Tr 65) 
Without waiving its earlier objection to all extrinsic 
evidence, Flying Diamond introduced the deposition testimony of 
the Land Manager of Champlin (Robert Lagerstrom} (Tr 90, R 528) 
about the purpose of the Surface Owner's Agreement: 
What we told the landowners was what we took to be the 
purpose. It was to obtain their cooperation, to keep 
their goodwill, to prevent any disputes which might 
arise from uses that someone might consider beyond the 
scope of our reservation, and to provide a reasonable 
compensation to the landowner for his cooperation. 
(Deposition of Lagerstrom, p. 21.) 
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formed in 1971 and receJ'led its deed t•' the Ranch, it so 
advised Champlin, 3nd that Champlin accepted the copy of the 
deed as sufficient for purposes of the Surface Owner's 
Agreement (Exh. 10 at R 5231. On December 21, 1971, Champlin 
clarified its earlier letter by advising Newton Sheep that 
(Plaintift's Exh. 9 at R 521) (emphasis added): 
In order to clarify any possible confusion 
regarding the statement quoted above from our letter 
of December 7th, please be ad·Jised that payment of 
2 l/2% of the value of production, if production is 
ever obtained, will be made to Newton Sheep Company 
onl as lon as Newton Shee Com an• is the current 
an owner. 
As indicated in our letter of December 7th and as 
recited in Section 7 of the Surface Owner's Agreement, 
the covenants of the Surface Owner's Agreement run 
with the surface ownership of the described premises. 
Therefore, if lands under production which are covered 
by this subject agreement was ever conveyed by Newton 
Sheep Company, then of course, Chamelin's obligation 
to pay the 2 1/2% of the value of each eroduction 
would, ueon sufficient notice to Chamelin, transfer to 
the new surface owner. 
Plaintiff's Exh. 20 (R 524) shows that, while Bass was 
negotiating the Deed transaction with Newton Sheep, Bass was 
advised by James Wallace (Bass's agent' t~at ·~-_!:~as the·; 
[Newton Sheep) own the surface they will recei.e l l i2% in the 
form of royalty which figur 0 s 128 ni-i 0 r3l acres oer section." 
(Emphasis added). 
0 -~ c ,,,.Jr ~)ur• ruled in fa-.ror of the Bass-Newton 
I"o r'1~,i1ngs are, essentially, that the conveyancing 
, • ·"1 t: ,1 t 'L ~ ,Jar t 1es '"as to acquire or reserve fractions of 
,,., "2 l.'2~ payment:" (that being the term used in the Findings 
•1 mean the Section 2 payment interest (R 427)) and the 
;onclusions are that the conveyances had that legal effect (R 
429). The court also concluded that Flying Diamond was 
~stopped, and that the Bass-Newton parties were not (R 429). 
Plying Diamond, as directed, submitted an accounting showing 
the payments made to it by Champlin. The court then entered 
the Final Judgment, which decrees that the Newtons are entitled 
to one-fourth, Bass is entitled to one-half, and Flying Diamond 
is entitled to one-fourth " . of the moneys paid heretofore 
and hereafter by Champlin under Section 2 of the Agreement," 
and which grants recovery from Flying Diamond of the respective 
fractional portions of the monies paid (R 460-463). The 
Judgment also contains the court's express determination of 
finality required for appeal by Utah R. Civ. P. 54. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. The 2 1/2% easement payment covenant, and the 
payments thereunder, are inseparable from the 
surface ownership because the Surface Owner's 
Agreement so operates as a matter of law, as 
appears from: 
(a) the recitals and legal background; 
(b) the provisions of the Agreement; and 
(cl the applicable rules of law. 
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(a) Recitals and legal background. 
The purpose of the Surface Owner's Agreement is best 
seen against the background of its formal preliminary recitals 
and the general law those recitals invoke. The recitals are: 
that the Newton Company owns the described property subject to 
a prior reservation of the minerals by Union Pacific Railroad 
Company; that Champlin has succeeded to the ownership of the 
oil and gas title; and that Champlin proposes entry upon the 
surface by it or its lessee for oil and gas purposes. 
This recital of the earlier severance of the mineral 
title from the surf ace title invokes the general legal 
consequence that severance vests some right of surface use in 
the mineral owner, either express or implied. This Court has 
stated the general relationship of the respective rights to be 
as follows: 
The general rule which is approved by all 
jurisdictions that have considered the matter is that 
the ownership (or rights of a lessee) of mineral 
rights in land is dominant over the rights of the 
owner of the fee to the extent reasonably necessary to 
extract the minerals therefrom. This dominance is 
limited in that the mineral owner may exercise that 
right only as reasonably necessary for that purpose 
and consistent with allowing the fee owner the 
greatest possible use of his property consistent 
therewith. 
Flying Diamond v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) 
(citations omitted). 
Some potential for disagreement between the respective 
owners as to what is reasonably necessary is inherent in this 
situation, and this subject is treated in a recent, lengthy 
-12~ 
annotation, Oil and Gas - Necessary Use of Surface, 53 A.L.R.3d 
16, 16-174. The introduction states (53 A.L.R.3d at 24): 
This annotation deals with some aspects of the 
"age-old battle between a surface owner and mineral 
owner as to their respective rights" in the surface of 
the premises embraced by the mineral lease. Of all 
questions that beset the lessee-lessor relationship, 
none surpasses that of surface user and the resulting 
surface damages: thus, there is a "voluminous 
reservoir of law concerning the use of the surface by 
a lessee under the terms of an oil and gas lease." 
[Citations omitted]. 
The annotator analyzes many cases deciding whether a 
particular surface use by the oil and gas operator is 
actionable, as being not reasonably necessary in the 
circumstances. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509 
(Utah 1976), cited above, illustrates the problem and is 
discussed in the annotation (p. 4, Pocket Supp. 1982). 
A footnote to the annotation (53 A.L.R.3d at 25, n.10) 
quotes Brimmer, The Rancher's Subservient Surface Estate, 5 
Land and Water L. Rev. 49, 50 (1970), about the practicalities 
of the surface-mineral conflict: 
The same writer has humorously pointed out that 
"if the meadows were wet and now badly rutted, and his 
mineral interest is nil anyway, then quicker than can 
be muttered 'Application for Temporary Injunction,' 
the client will demand the balm of instant legal 
redress and damages as an alternative to his itchy 
shotgun trigger finger." 
The persuasive power of surface occupiers' itchy 
trigger fingers may be seen in the fact that they have 
been able in many areas to obtain compensation for 
surface or "location" damages which they well may not 
have had legal right to recover, but which have been 
paid by oil and gas producers as a matter of 
policy •••. 
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Before the Surface Owner's Ag1eemer1t was entered into, 
the relationship of the respective surface rights of the owners 
of the mineral and surface estates in the Newton Sheep Ranch 
held the potential difficulties discussed in the annotationo 
The Agreement was written against that general legal 
background. The testimony of Champlin's veteran land manager 
about the general purpose of the Agreement, and the purpose of 
the inseparability provisions, quoted above, show that the 
practical business objective is to obviate problems of the kind 
detailed in the cited annotation, on a continuing basis. 
The essence of the Agreement lies in the 
inseparability provisions, the exchanged promises of the Newton 
Company and Champlin that during the term of the Agreement the 
payment covenants will not be separated from the surface 
ownership. If the Newton Company's inseparability promises 
could be ignored unilaterally, the relation between the surface 
and mineral estates would revert to what it was before the 
Agreement was signed. The Agreement's purpose would be 
thwarted. 
(b) The provisions of Surface Owner's Agreement 
determine the inseparability of the payment 
covenants and the monies payable thereunder 
as a matter of law. 
The Surface Owner's Agreement provides, as clearly as 
language can convey meaning, that the surface payment 
covenants, and the proceeds, can not be separated from the 
surface ownership. 
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Section 7 states the parties' agreement concerning 
the covenants to pay the sums provided in Sections 2, 3, 
ind S hereof [i.e., all three payment covenants]" as follows: 
Such covenants • ••• shall be covenants running 
with the surface ownership"; 
The covenants • ••• shall not be held 
separately [from the surface ownership]---;-
The covenants • ••• shall not be • 
transferred separately [from the surface ownership]"; 
and 
• any sums payable under this Agreement shall be 
paid to the person or persons owning the surface of 
the described premises as of the date the oil and gas 
or associated liquid hydrocarbon production is 
marketed;" a "subsequent purchaser of the described 
premises" is entitled to the payments upon showing a 
chain of title to "such ownership." 
(Emphasis added). 
Apart from this language, other specially drafted 
provisions reinforce the agreed inseparability. These are: 
(1) The successors-and-assigns provision. Section 10 
permits either party to assign the agreement; its benefits and 
burdens extend to successors and assigns. This standard 
provision, however, is here expressly agreed to be "[s]ubject 
to the provisions of Section 7." 
Section 7 states the inseparability provisions. The 
surface ownership and the covenants thus are transferrable, but 
only simultaneously and only to the same successor owner. 
Section 10 also precludes the separated transfer the 
Bass-Newton parties say they attempted. 
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(2) Identical handling o[ all payment covenants. 
Section 7 accords identical attributes to all tr1e easement 
payment covenants (the 2 1/2% payment; the acteage rental; an<i 
the damage payments): in the same terms, all are agreed to be 
inseparable from the surface title. 
The inherent content of the covenant to reimburse 
damages to the Ranch surface is such that that covenant could 
not be transferred to another ranch property without destroying 
its meaning, nor could it with any logic be transferred in 
gross. The covenant to pay acreage rents is, in the same way, 
inseparable from this Ranch surface; to attempt to move it to 
another property would deprive it of any content, nor could it 
well be transferred in gross. The fact that the 2 1/2% 
covenant is treated in the same terms as the other two 
covenants shows the original parties' recognition that that 
covenant is also by its nature inseparable from this Ranch 
surface so long as the Agreement endures. 
(3) Reciprocal nature of exchanged covenants. The 
easement benefits granted by Sec. 1 are for Champlin's use in 
connection with its oil and gas estate, and they continue for 
the benefit of successor owners of the oil and gas estate (Sec. 
8); the easement burdens encumber the surface in the hands of 
"present and future owners" of the surface {Sec. 8). Being 
appurtenances to this oil and gas title, Champlin could not 
unilaterally deed the easement title to the owner of another 
mineral section, nor could it use the easements in operations 
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~pon other mineral sections of its own. The easement benefits 
""J burdens are inseparable from the described property for the 
J imited life of this oil and gas project, and it is inherent in 
this pattern that the compensating payments are likewise tied 
to the described property for the life of the project. 
( 4) Match of surface payments to surface burdens. 
Each of the easement payment covenants is so written that the 
amount of each recurring payment is adjustable, according to 
the degree of burden compensated: the acreage rental 
adjustment takes account of the area occupied and its ranching 
value; the surface damage payments match the damage caused; the 
2 1/2% payment automatically varies in direct proportion with 
the intensity of production and marketing. This 
self-adjustment also operates in respect to timing, so that the 
separate remittances are payable when the particular easement 
burden is felt. Finally, the right to the individual payments 
is vested by the Agreement in the person affected by the 
impacts of the easements, the surface owner at the time. This 
fundamentally fair matching of payment to burden underlies the 
economic sense of the Agreement and explains why it precludes 
the alienation of severed fractions of the easement payment 
covenant. 
(c) Applicable rules of real property law and 
contract law. 
The initial theory of Bass and the Newtons was that 
the royalty described in the Deed was the 2 1/2% easement 
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payment interest. The real property theory was Late>r 
disclaimed in favor of the theory that the case involves only a 
contractual assignment of monies paid and to he paid by 
Champlin. The course of this shift of position is detailed 1r, 
Point V. 
Flying Diamond submits that the 2 l/2% easement 
payment covenant is, as the parties who created it called it, a 
"covenant running with the surface ownership," and that 
questions concerning its incidents are governed by real 
property law and not contract law. In the event, here, the 
rules of both bodies of law lead to the same result. 
This brief analyzes the legal nature of the 2 1/2% 
easement payment covenant, and the transferability of the 
covenant and its proceeds, in terms of real property law and 
also the rules of assignment developed in the law of contracts. 
(1) Real Property Principles. 
The Surface Owner's Agreement provides (Section 7) 
that all of the payment covenants are "covenants running with 
the surface ownership." 
A basic textbook, 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real 
Property, 'II 673 [l], pp. 60-35 to 60-38 (1981) (footnotes 
omitted), states with respect to the running of covenants: 
[l) Generally. Covenants are either personal, 
that is they are enforceable only by the original 
covenantee, or they "run with the land." The 
difference hinges upon whether the original 
covenanting parties' respective rights or duties can 
devolve upon their successors. The covenantee's 
rights are known as the "benefit" while the 
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coven3n~or's duties are known as the "burden." When 
certain requirements are met, the benefit or the 
burden runs with the land to the covanantee's or the 
covenanter's successors. 
The concept of covenants running with the land 
evolved from two separate lines of cases. The first 
line of cases began with the decision of an English 
court in Spencer's Case, where the plaintiff 
unsuccessfully brought suit at law to recover damages 
for breach of covenant. This line of cases thus 
concerns the running of covenants at law, or so-called 
"real covenants." Another English decision, in 1848, 
Tulk v. Moxhay, enjoined the breach of a covenant in 
equity, beginning a line of cases dealing with the 
running of covenants in equity, referred to in this 
Treatise as "equitable restrictions." 
Different requirements have developed for the 
running of real covenants and the running of equitable 
restrictions. The elements most often said to be 
required for covenants to run at law are that: (1) 
the covenant "touch and concern" the land; (2) the 
original covenanting parties intend the covenant to 
run; and (3) there be some form of privity of estate. 
A fourth requirement, that the covenant be in writing, 
is also sometimes mentioned. For covenants to run in 
equity, courts require that: (1) the covenant "touch 
and concern" the land; (2) the original covenanting 
parties intend the covenant to run; and (3) the 
successor to the burden have "notice" of the 
covenant. 
Powell also shows that a running covenant is an 
interest in land, for Statute of Frauds purposes. (Id. 11 671, 
pp, 60-14 to 60-15). 
The rule recognized in the general law of contracts is 
that if a covenant runs with land and is not merely personal, 
it is to be construed and enforced in accordance with rules of 
real property law. The principles of contract law do not 
necessarily apply. Restatement of Contracts, Second, S 
316(2) (1981). Comment b. to S 316 of the Contracts Restatement 
explains: 
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The law relating to covenants in conveyances and 
leases of land grew up as a part of the law of real 
property and is left to the Restatement, Second, of 
Property. 
All elements mentioned by Powell as being required tor 
the running of the benefit of the 2 1/2% covenant, both at law 
and in equity ("touch and concern," intent, privity, notice) 
appear in the present case: 
"Touch and concern." Powell states (Id. 11 673 [2] [a], 
pp. 60-40 to 60-41) (footnotes omitted): 
The rule that a covenant cannot run with the land 
at law or in equity if it is only indirectly related 
to the land was derived from dicta in Spencer's Case. 
Known as the "touch and concern" requirement, the rule 
retains force today, although it has been greatly 
relaxed. The touch and concern requirement is the 
only essential for the running of covenants which 
focuses on an objective analysis of the contents of 
the covenant itself rather than the intentions of and 
relationships between the parties. 
The majority of courts and writers now accept the 
test for the "touching and concerning of covenants" 
proposed by Dean Harry Bigelow, an eminent authority 
on the subject of covenants. Dean Bigelow said that 
if the covenantor's legal interest in land is rendered 
less valuable by the covenant's performance, then the 
burden of the covenant satisfies the requirement that 
the covenant touch and concern land. If, on the other 
hand, the covenantee's legal interest in land is 
rendered more valuable by the covenant's performance, 
then the benefit of the covenant satisfies the 
requirement that the covenant touch and concern land. 
[Footnotes omitted] • 
The textbook cites as examples of running real 
covenants "payments for the use of an easement." Id. ~ 675 
[2) [a), pp. 60-89 to 60-90. That is this case. Powell's 
analysis shows (Id. 1f 675 [2) [al, pp. 60-89 to 60-92) that an 
affirmative covenant to pay meets the "touch and concern" test 
where the underlying purpose is benefit to covenanter's own 
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land. Here, the exchange of easement for covenanted payments 
clearly benefits (and burdens) each affected estate. Touch and 
'nncern inheres directly in each estate in the land, and is not 
merely collateral. 
Intent element. The parties to the Surface Owner's 
Agreement expressly stated that the 2 1/2% payment covenant 
would run with the surface ownership and this, according to 
Powell (Id. 11 673 [2] [b], p. 60-51), "should normally be 
decisive" as to the intent element. 
Privity. Various kinds of privity have been required 
in the cases for the running of a covenant benefit ("mutual" -
simultaneous inter es ts in same land; "horizontal" - connected 
with a conveyance; and "vertical" - succession to affected 
estate). These are discussed at length by Powell. Id.' 
673 [2] [c], pp. 60-57 to 60-68. It is clear for present 
purposes that the grant of the appurtenant surface easement in 
exchange for the covenanted payments, and Flying Diamond's 
succession in title to the covenantee's surface estate, create 
such privity as is sufficient to meet any and all of the tests. 
Notice. The recordation of the Surface Owner's 
Agreement satisfies the notice requirement. 
The consequence of the determination that the 2 1/2% 
covenant benefit runs with the surface ownership is that when 
the estate with which it runs is later conveyed (here, the 
surface grant to Flying Diamond) the benefit necessarily passes 
as a part of the estate conveyed. 
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Real covenants are sometimes enc:ounter<>d in oi J arid 
gas conveyancing. The surface covenants involved here are, in 
their nature, similar to the standard "free qas" covenant 
(lessee's promise that the surface owner shall have gas, it 
available, at his residence on the property, without cost), 
The free-gas covenant has consistently been held to be a 
covenant running with the surface ownership, the benefit of 
which accrues automatically to the successor surface owner. 
Justice v. Pennzoil Co., 598 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 967 (1979): Jackson v. Farmer, 225 Kan. 732, 
594 P.2d 177 (1979): Patrick v. Allen, 350 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 
1961): Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Huffman, 376 P.2d 599 (Okla. 
1962) (by implication); Annot., 79 A.L.R. 496, 502 (1932). 
By operation of accepted real property principles, the 
grant of the Ranch surface title by Newton Sheep to Flying 
Diamond carried with it (by operation of law, as well as by the 
express covenant terms) the benefits of these payment covenants 
and the right to enforce them: the grant also divested Newton 
Sheep of all such benefits and rights. The rule is stated in 
II American Law of Property, S 9.19 (1952): 
While the original covenantee retains the 
benefited land, he alone may sue to enforce the 
covenant either upon the basis of privity of contract 
or upon privity of estate. But when he has 
transferred his entire estate in the benefited land, 
the benefit has run to the assignee, and the latter 
alone can enforce the privity of estate basis of 
liability since the original covenantee no longer has 
any ownership of the benefited estate. Likewise, the 
assignee is also the only one who can enforce the 
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privity of contract liability. This ~s on the theory 
that the contract right is impliedly assigned with the 
benefited land, so as to pass with the benefit to the 
assignee. 
(2) Principles of Contract Law. 
If the problem presented by this case is analyzed in 
terms of the rules of contract law, the result is the same as 
that stated above. An assignment of fractional interests in 
the 2 1/2% payment interest, or an assignment of the individual 
payments accruing from time to time, cannot be given any legal 
effect. The Restatement of Contracts, Second, S 317(2) (1981) 
(emphasis added), states: 
(2) A contractual right can be assigned unless 
(a) the substitution of a right of the assignee 
for the right of the assignor would materially change 
the duty of the obliger, or materially increase the 
burden of risk imposed on him by his contract, or 
materially impair his chance of obtaining return 
performance, or materially reduce its value to him, or 
(bl the assignment is forbidden by statute or is 
otherwise inoperative on grounds of public policy, or 
(c) assignment is validly precluded by contract. 
Both underlined exceptions to S 317(2) are 
applicable. No contractual right to the 2 1/2% payment can be 
assigned. Subsection (c) applies because an assignment in 
gross of fractions of the covenant, or the recurring money 
payments, is precluded by contract provisions which forbid 
separate transfer and separate holding, and which vest the 
right of payment in the person who owns the surface when the 
individual remittance falls due. Subsection (a) applies 
because a diversion of remittances to a stranger to the surface 
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title would materially "reduce the value" to Champlin of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement. The purpose of the Agreement would 
be thwarted, as discussed in Point I(a). 
The Bass-Newton assignment theory fails for an 
additional reason, founded in the language the parties used in 
the Deed. Even if the Deed could be read as if it were an 
assignment of future remittances, and even if the supposed 
assignment were not otherwise precluded, the Deed language 
would transfer only those payments to which the Grantor is 
•entitled" when the payment is due. The underlying condition 
is Newton Sheep's •entitlement• to the remittance, and this 
terminated upon its sale of the Ranch surface by operation of 
the very instrument creating the remittance obligation. The 
subject of assignment of conditional rights is treated in 
Restatement of Contracts, Second, § 320 (1981). It is there 
said that a conditional right can be assigned before the 
condition occurs, and that "the assignee's right is subject to 
the same conditions as was the assignor's." Id. Comment c. 
Thus, A can validly assign his future wages at X Company, but 
if he later resigns his employment the assignee has no claim 
upon the wages of X Company's next employee. The principle 
further defeats respondents' alternative theory. 
Point II. Practical construction of the Surf ace 
Owner's Agreement by the parties 
shows that the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant is inseparable from the surface 
ownership. 
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As shown above, the 2 1/2% easement payment covenant 
and the accruing payments are as a matter of law inseparable 
frDm the surface title. This point can be validated through 
examination of the parties' actions pursuant to the Surface 
owner's Agreement. 
Some years before production, Champlin accepted Newton 
Sheep's showing of its sucession to the surface title and took 
some care to advise Newton Sheep that the payments under the 
2 1/2% covenant are inseparable from the surface ownership. 
(Exh. 9 at R 521). Later, Champlin accepted Flying Diamond's 
proof of its surface ownership. Champlin began monthly 
payments to Flying Diamond, as surface owner, when oil and gas 
marketing commenced. Champlin continued these surface payments 
notwithstanding that it was apprised of this suit when 
pre-trial discovery involved its personnel, and continues to do 
so to the present time. 
Flying Diamond, by acts, construed the Agreement 
identically. Before production was obtained, Flying Diamond 
advised Champlin of its acquisition of the surface ownership. 
Flying Diamond has routinely accepted the 2 1/2% payments as 
its own. Upon the Newton demand to participate, it brought 
this action to declare its right to the covenant benefits. 
Newton Sheep itself earlier submitted proof of its 
acquisition of surface title to Champlin for purposes of the 
Surface Owner's Agreement. (Exhs. 9 at R 521, 10 at R 523). 
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Similarly, although Bass and the Newtons now assert 
~at their actions effectively separated the covenant payment 
from the surface title, their conduct shows a most practical 
recognition of inseparability. The Deed, drafted by Bass, was 
prepared within a mon~ or two after Newton Sheep had been 
fully advised by Champlin about ~e inseparability provisions 
of Section 7. The Deed warrants the one-half mineral title in 
~e fee lands; in contrast, the purported royalty grant in the 
Railroad lands operates only to ~e extent that Newton Sheep is 
•entitled." The quit-claim nature of the second grant 
recognizes ~e severability problem, then further addresses it 
in ~e second paragraph of Subparagraph B., which provides: 
In addition to ~e specific warranties of 
paragraph IV hereof, ~e Grantor, as a real covenant, 
specifically covenants ~at the interest conveyed in 
~is subparagraph B. constitutes a mutual covenant 
running wi~ the land described on Exhibit "B", and 
all successive future owners of the interest conveyed 
under ~e provisions of this subparagraph B., shall 
have ~e right to invoke and enforce its provisions as 
~e original signers thereto. 
The two covenants Newton Sheep here makes concerning the 
fractional royalty it has purportedly severed and conveyed to a 
grantee owning no other interest in ~e Railroad lands, are (a) 
that ~e royalty runs with the Railroad lands, and (b) that it 
does not run but is enforceable in gross by all fractional 
successor royalty owners. The covenants contradict each 
o~er. Newton Sheep's breach is built in. Bass can have its 
money back if it chooses. 
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Practical construction is • ..• entitled to great, if 
not controlling influence" in ascertaining contract meaning. 
I 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 274 (1964). The actions of all 
lhe parties show recognition, in practice, that the benefit of 
the covenant payments is inherent in the surface title. 
Point III. The trial court improperly admitted 
extrinsic evidence; evidence of the 
"intent" of the parties to the Deed is 
immaterial because the earlier Surface 
Owner's Agreement is without ambiguity and 
is dispositive. 
Before trial, Flying Diamond submitted a motion for 
partial summary judgment based on the theory that the 
unambiguous provisions of the Surface Owner's Agreement 
determine the case. This motion was renewed at trial and an 
objection was made to the admission of any extrinsic evidence. 
These motions were denied and the objection was overruled. It 
is argued in this point that the rulings were erroneous. 
The rule in Utah governing deed construction was 
stated in Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) 
(footnotes ommitted) (emphasis in original), as follows: 
This Court has long recognized the cardinal rule 
of deed construction that the intention of the parties 
as drawn from the whole deed must govern. 
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of 
deeds is a question of law for the court, and the main 
object in construing a deed is to ascertain the 
intention of the parties, especially that of the 
granter, from the language used. The description of 
the property in a deed is prima facie an expression of 
the intention of the granter and the term "intention," 
as applied to the construction of a deed, is to be 
-27-
distinguished from its usual connotatirin. When so 
applied, it is a term of art and s1gni fies a meanrng 
of the writing. 
Deeds are to be construed l ikP other wr 1 t ten 
instruments, and where a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary 
its terms. It is the court's duty to construe a deed 
as it is written, and in the final analysis, each 
instrument must be construed in the light of its own 
language and peculiar facts. It is also well known 
that the intention of the parties to a conveyance is 
open to interpretation only when the words used are 
ambiguous. 
The same rule is expressed in Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1379 
(Utah 1977) (footnote omitted) ("The deed is clear and 
unambiguous. When the intention of the parties can be 
ascertained from the words used in the deed, there remains 
nothing to effectuate that intention.&) 
It is apparent from a reading of the Surface Owner's 
Agreement, and increasingly apparent on re-readings, that the 
instrument was prepared with as much care as can be brought to 
legal drafting work. The Agreement is without ambiguity. Its 
provisions operate as a matter of law and require a judgment in 
Flying Diamond's favor. 
If the Agreement so operates, evidence proferred by 
Bass and the Newtons about the subjective intent behind their 
later Deed is not material. It could not matter that they may 
have intended an attempt at a transfer of an interest in the 
2 1/2% payment covenant because they could not have done so, 
Point IV. The 2 l/2% payment covenant is not a "royalty 
(of any type)," and therefore the Deed from 
Newton Sheep to Bass did not grant, or reserve, 
any interest therein. 
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Initially, the case presented by Bass and the Newtons 
,as based on the theory that the 2 1/2% easement payment 
,ovenant is a royalty, and that the "royalty (of any type)" 
Language of the Bass-Newton Deed granted one-half, and reserved 
one-half, of the interest. The case was briefed on the royalty 
theory. A memorandum filed by Bass argues: 
A. The 2 1/2% payment by Champlin is a royalty 
and assignable: -- The 2 1/2% share in the production 
from oil an gas granted to the Newtons is a 
nonparticipating royalty carved out of the oil and gas 
estate by the owner (Champlin) in favor of a third 
party (the Newtons). This type of royalty is called 
"non-participating• because it does not include 
participation in bonuses or delay rentals and because 
it carries no right to lease or to produce the oil and 
gas [citations omitted]. 
A nonparticipating royalty may be created by 
grant, as here, or by reservation either before or 
after a mineral lease is issued. The royalty in this 
case is a present vested incorporeal interest in the 
oil and gas estate and in the production therefrom. 
(Memorandum ••• In Support of [Bass's] Motion for 
Summary Judgment; R 126-7). 
At trial, the Bass-Newton parties sought to prove 
intent that the royalty grant conveyed the 2 1/2% payment: the 
Collister testimony was wholly directed to that point. The 
findings and conclusions submitted by the Bass-Newton parties 
to the lower court reflects the royalty theory. The basic 
findings recite such an intent and the conclusions are that the 
conveyances effected the transfer of "the 2 1/2% payment" 
interest (Findings 6, 9; Conclusions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9). 
A theoretical difficulty with all this lies in the 
premise that the •2 1/2% payment• is a "royalty•: if as a 
-29-
legal matter it is not a royalti' (a tPrrn r•d'1H•Y d technical 
meaning) a substantial problem of law is rc.1s"'rl as to whether 
the Deed conveyed it. This may well have prompted the 
post-trial disavowal of the royalty theory by tt1e Bass··Newtor• 
par ties. 
"Royalty• is defined by Williams~ Meyers (H. Williams 
and C< Meyers, Oil and Gas Terms, 656 1:ith ed. 1981)) as 
follows: 
(1) The landowner's share of production, free of 
expenses of production. 
(2) A share of production, free of expenses of 
production, e<g., an overriding Royalty (q.v.) of 1/8 of 
the 7/8 working interest. 
The Hornbook (R. Hemingway, Oil and Gas, S 2.7(C), p. 
52 (1971)) states: 
In the vast majority of jurisdictions a grant 
or reservation of a •royalty" interest will be 
interpreted as creating a non-cost bearing interest 
that will share only in a fractional portion of gross 
production, and will not participate in bonus, delay 
rentals, or the power to lease. 
In a few jurisdictions, notably Oklahoma, the 
term •royalty• is treated as being uncertain in 
meaning and circumstances surrounding the transaction 
will bear on the supposed intent of the parties. 
Generally speaking, a grant of a "royalty" interest at 
a time when no lease is in existence will be construed 
as denoting a fully participating mineral estate; 
however, if a lease is in effect intent will be 
construed as indicating an interest that will share 
only in gross production. It is submitted that a 
treatment of the term "royalty• as uncertain in 
meaning is unsound. 
These standard definitions of "royalty" have it in 
common that the term connotes a property interest in the oil 
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,nu qas. As shown above, Bass itself so argued to the trial 
'~uurt. (R 126-7). 
Bass's position that the 2 1/2% easement payment 
uvenant is a "nonparticipating royalty" which was "carved out" 
,,t Champlin's oil and gas estate in favor of the Newtons and is 
"a present vested incorporeal interest in the oil and gas 
estate," is plainly incorrect. The 2 1/2% payment is not a 
royalty in any standard legal sense. Moreover, and more 
important here, Bass's assertion is flatly contradicted by 
Section 4 of the Surface Owner's Agreement: "Nothing herein 
contained shall be construed as • • • a grant to Land Owner of 
oil or gas rights or rights in other associated liquid 
hydrocarbons." (R 480; Exh. 1). 
Since Newton Sheep, as successor in interest under the 
Surface Owner's Agreement, did not own a royalty in the 
railroad lands, its quitclaim of a royalty therein to Bass had 
no effect. 
Point v. The Final Judgment is erroneous because it is 
based on a theory of the case (that the Deed is 
an "assignment" of money proceeds) for which 
there is no support in the evidence or the 
findings and conclusions, and which is contrary 
to the Bass-Newton evidence. 
As detailed above, the Bass-Newton case was 
essentially briefed and tried on the theory that the royalty 
grant to Bass conveyed a fractional interest in the 2 1/2% 
easen1ent payment covenant. The record reflects, however, that 
in the course of the matter the alternative theory developed 
that the Deed is an "assignment" of money proceeds. The 
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opening statement of Bass refers to lhe theory (Tr ':>4). After 
findings and conclusions were entered (based on the royalty 
theory), the Bass-Newton parties apparently abandoned their 
royalty theory in favor of the assignment theory. 
The second position is stated in the Memorandum Of 
Bass ••• In Response To Plaintiff's Motions (R 419-20) ~ 
It appears that plaintiff [Flying Diamond] sees 
the case from an entirely different point of view than 
do the Newtons and Bass. One would assume from the 
plaintiff's argument that this case is concerned with 
an effort to sever a property interest from the 
surface title, or to sever and transfer fractional 
interests in real property, or to assign a covenant, 
or to alter the bargain between Champlin and the 
Newtons or to assign a contractual right. This case 
is none of these things ••• 
* * * * 
The question before the court is whether 
interests in the proceeds of an obligation to pay 
money are assignable. Nothing has been offered by 
plaintiff to show that a money obligation cannot be 
dealt with in such a manner. 
The consequence of abandonment of the royalty theory 
is that it leaves the Final Judgment without support. The 
language of the Deed itself does not support it. None of the 
trial evidence supports the assignment theory, indeed, to the 
extent that the Bass evidence touches the subject matter it 
contradicts the assignment theory. 
The Deed is not, nor does it purport to be, an 
assignment of the monies paid and to be paid by Champlin. On 
its face it is a present conveyance by a grantor to a grantee 
of a fractional royalty interest in described lands, 
accompanied by such standard real estate elements as a further 
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assurances covenant, warranty provisions, and a preferential 
right of purchase of minerals and royalty reserved to the 
3rantor (treating them identically). 
Bass's trial effort was wholly taken up trying to 
prove that the Deed's intent was to convey a fractional royalty 
interest. No witness testified that the Deed was intended to 
be an assignment of monies. 
Bass's conveyancer testified that he considered the 
2 1/2% covenant to be a royalty and that the Deed he prepared 
was intended to convey that royalty (Deposition of Collister (R 
527), pp. 22, 25, 48, 49), conceding the obvious that 
"probably" the royalty grant would operate only upon what the 
grantor was entitled to grant (p. 36, lines 4-9). 
The testimony of Mr. Collister precludes the new 
theory that the Deed can be read as if it were a contractual 
assignment of money proceeds. The witness said he employed 
words of grant sufficient to convey property in Utah 
(Deposition, p. 34), and that " ••• my deed paragraph A 
conveys minerals, and paragraph B conveys royalty" (Deposition, 
p" 49, 11. 6-7 [emphasis added]). He took care to note the 
existence of the basic legal distinction between mineral and 
royalty (p. 49, 1. 7) then went on to say that other kinds of 
interests also exist: "No, there are ~ things clearly. 
The contractual right to receive monies, you know.• (p. 49, 
11. 22-24 (emphasis added)). 
The record made by the Bass-Newton parties by their 
sole witness thus is that their Deed was intended to convey 
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royalty if it could, and that "royally" differs 1n Kind from 
"minerals" and from the "contractual rrgnt to rece1ve monies," 
This record is fatal to the late-adopted-assignment theory. 
The Judgment, founded as it is on a legal after-
thought, is erroneous because it is unsupported by any evidence 
or by the findings and conclusions, and because rt is contrary 
to the evidence. 
Point VI. Estoppel by deed, arising out of the Surface 
Owner's Agreement, precludes any claim by the 
Newtons or Bass to the 2 1/2% easement payment 
covenant or the monies accruing thereunder. 
The Newtons (and their privy, Bass) are precluded from 
claims upon the benefit of the payment covenants by the bar of 
estoppel by deed. 
The Surface Owner's Agreement consists essentially of 
the Newton Company's grant of the surface easements and, in 
consideration thereof, Champlin's payment covenants. The 
Newton Company agrees that the payment covenants run with, and 
are not to be held or transferred separately from, the surface 
ownership. The Newtons and Bass now claim, to the contrary, 
that they have transferred and now hold fractional benefits in 
the covenant interest separately from the surface ownership. 
Estoppel by deed precludes the second assertion. The principle 
is stated in 28 Am. Jur, 2d, Estoppel And Waiver, § 4 (1966) 
(footnotes omitted): 
The principle is that when a man has entered into 
a solemn engagement by deed, he shall not be permitted 
to deny any matter which he has asserted therein, for 
a deed is a solemn act to any part of which the law 
gives effect as the deliberate admission of the maker; 
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to him it stands for truth, and in every situation in 
which he may be placed with respect to it, it is true 
as to him .... 
Estoppal by deed is a very important aspect of 
the law of estoppel. By reason of the operation of 
this doctrine, particularly upon grantors of real 
property and upon the passage of after-acquired title 
of such grantors, the effect of the doctrine upon 
grantees, and the effect and extent of control of 
recitals in conveyances as an estoppal upon parties 
thereto and their privies, many important and 
practical questions affecting the title to real 
property are controlled to a large extent •. 
Estoppal by deed is particularly appropriate where, as 
here, the document is recorded in the land records of the 
County: 
A person who is examining the record title to 
realty should be able to rely on the doctrine of 
estoppal by deed, without the necessity of having to 
investigate the possibility of a personal obligation 
to pay a money debt which might offset the estoppel by 
deed. 
Id. Moreover, this estoppal operates with special force because 
of the Newton Company's declaration in the Surface Owner's 
~greement that all of the payment covenants, including the 2 
1/2% payment, are "covenants running with the surface 
ownership" of the Ranch: 
Estoppels which run with the land and work 
thereon are not mere conclusions; they pass estates 
and constitute titles, and are muniments of title, 
assuring it to the purchaser. 
Id. § 8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
The estoppal precludes any Bass and Newton assertions 
of fractional titles in the 2 1/2% covenant interest. Further, 
since equity will not permit a result to be worked indirectly 
if that result is directly prohibited, Bass and the Newtons are 
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also estopped from claiming an interest rn inclividual money 
remittances falling due under the easement payment covenant. 
Point VII. The lower court's Conc1us1on (Ne>. '/) that 
"Flying Diamond is estopped to deny that 1t 
has only a one-four th interest in the 2 l/2% 
payment" is erroneous, 1n that~ 
(a) no evidence supports it; and 
(b) the documents provide otherwise. 
Conclusion No. 7 reflects acceptance by the lower 
court of an estoppel contention advanced in Bass's Trial 
Memorandum (R 363-5). The conclusion is based on Finding No. 9 
that it was Flying Diamond's •intent" to acquire "one-fourth" 
of the "2 1/2% payment." The theory of the claimed estoppel is 
that when Flying Diamond bought the Ranch surface it also 
bought one-half of the "royalty (of any type)" then held by 
Newton Sheep; and that by intentionally and knowingly 
purchasing a one-fourth interest in the royalty, Flying Diamond 
is estopped from claiming a greater interest therein. Bass 
cited Russell v. Texas Co., 238 F. 2d 636 (9th Ciro 1956); 
Dillon Inv. Co. v. Kinikin, 172 Kan. 523, 241 P.2d 493 (1952); 
and 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 13 (1966). These 
authorities state the generalization that the grantee of a deed 
is estopped from accepting the benefits of a transaction while 
at the same time inconsistently rejecting the accompanying 
burdens. 
Since the Bass-Newton parties abandoned any claim upon 
the 2 1/2% covenant based on a real property theory of the 
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CdSe, an estoppel by deed concept becomes irrelevant. However, 
that may be, no estoppel of Flying Diamond exists here. 
The generalization mentioned above has no operation in 
this case. While the grant to Flying Diamond in the Ranch 
Purchase Contract was a warranted "full" title to the surface, 
it was a mere quitclaim of half the minerals then owned by 
Seller in the fee lands and a quitclaim of half of any royalty 
Seller "is entitled to receive" in the railroad lands. 
There is no inconsistency between the purchase in 1974 
of a warranted surface title together with a quit-claim of half 
of the Seller's railroad •royalty," if any, and Flying 
Diamond's present position that the grant of the surface 
incorporated all the burdens and benefits of the surface 
covenants and that the "royalty" quitclaim was, like that to 
Bass, ineffective. Flying Diamond's position is simply that 
the Ranch Purchase Contract applies in accordance with all of 
its terms. 
It is settled law that a quitclaim will not give rise 
to an estoppel. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 9 
(1966). "[A) grantee • may deny that any estate or 
interest passed to him by a conveyance.• Id. § 13. 
Further, Finding No. 9, on which the claimed estoppel 
rests, is unsupported. The trial record contains no extrinsic 
evidence whatever about Flying Diamond's subjective "intent.• 
Only the document itself is in evidence, and the intent stated 
there is to acquire half the royalty, if any, that the Seller 
can grant. The failure of the Finding to reflect the 
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conditional (quitclaiming) riature of the part-Les' "intent" 1s 
critical. Finding No. 9 is necessarily incorrect. Conclusion 
No. 7 is therefore wrong because unsupported, 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment below should be vacated. The case should 
be remanded with a direction to the court below to enter 
judgment in Flying Diamond's favor declaring its ownership of 
the benefits of the 2 1/2% payment covenant, and its proceeds, 
free of any adverse claim of the Newtons or Bass, and to 
proceed with the disposition of the remaining issues of the 
litigation. 
DATED this 7 tf day of October, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Clifford o. Stone, Jr. 
Katherine A. Zessin 
1700 Broadway, Suite 900 
Denver, Colorado 80290 
Counsel for Bow Valley 
By 
Exploration (U.S.) Inc. 
(Successor to Flying Diamond 
Oil Corporation) 
Hardin A. Whitney 
John w. Horsley 
H. Dennis Piercey 
of the firm of 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Flying Diamond 
Oil Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
+L 
I hereby certify that on the 1 ~day of October, 1983, I 
served a copy of the attached Brief of Appellant by mailing a copy 
thereof in a securely sealed, postage paid envelope to the 
following: 
William J. Cayias 
CAYIAS, LIVINGSTON, & SMITH 
1558 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Attorney for Newton Respondents 
Claron C. Spencer 
BEESLEY, SPENCER, & FAIRCLOUGH 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent Bass Enterprises 
Production Company 
[JIJ:'LIC:.'!'C: C!ll·::li:.:-L 
Cfii.!:PLJ.1:'3 CG?! 
Hu. C-J.6-·n 
.I •. .-. 'll•.: ' 1 ·~ :_.., .!.; (.(;)',, i, .l \L .. :, C"'Jr,01··1l.\0·· ·,.,Jt l_..;;;l' ~1_,•, 1_1 , 1 
f '~;-~in:ftc1· for co:1'.•c:niencC' Cc•.llccl t11c "L.:i.;1ci 0'.'ne::-"), .')_1~,1 Cii;c:.:PLJ.i~ 
1 ?:.'JIO.Ll::Ui \ c;o: ;;' .. \iff (here inc:.:t c:1· for convcnicnc c c v.llcd 11 Ci1:i.;~.pl.t.n") ; 
II 1 T H S S S E 'l' II: 
?J::Cl'l'f\LS: 
L.:t:Hi o·.rn·::r j_r; t:1c O\IJ1Cr oc' tlir. follo'.:! nr, clcsc:ri.'ocd p1·c:.1isc:; 
:.~r~.i.nci~·tcr rcfcn·cd to o.s "cicscr .ibc.;d prr-rii.sc::;": -
... ::(' ::.Js ...... ~'c1·i,'.1.in, :.u···~1t ~0.1;\t~·, I L:.1h. 
' ·' 
- 1 - APPENDIX A 
~. 
·~ .. :, 
., _;11...\ v( '1•;_-· -CV u~ ..... (t 1 11:.:.11:1::d 11\ ... Cl'l'L,l\[\ li<l'<l ot• dL''.rl;. l1l C0nVC•\'.lllC~, 
.ol]l)'"S: It'' .. :·1.11\l"/ J(':·iJ o. l1l"l t.1'.'l'l .v\:tl''.·:hv1· )./,1°'.I(), l10·1 \:n\on \'<i<:i .. ic 
r11~.d ...:0:.1:111'1·: l0 i't~l1 ... 1 ~.11·,1011, i·..:(..;c11·r<t:(l ::.J1·c!1 f·,1u~1·1, in ··.ool-: 1 .il: l·.:11,<.: :11; 
,'ntv ·;t·c:cJ ''c, .:·:"Ji1 dlll.d "11•·11.<'.;: .!:~,l 1J'.Jll, L1·l1·1: 1·lin1l 1.11,:\11c :\.i1l1•J...:d ::nn:1.iny 
·~.>.:on(l1r, 1·.'.), •:nnrlic· .ind l'ho:::i1J ~i. {..onr!ic, rccorr\(~d 1·c·l>n1.1J"'.' 3,tc:iu, in . 
J.!,1L ~·=1~c· JL; './.1rt·.~:·.Lv 1~c.~=n ··a. ?.7~\'." cl.J.tcc' .;l 1 l~: "J.), 1°(1'), fi·o;-:1 L·nion 
Ir 1'1ic''.;Jll1·u~1C 1:r,·-,n,1n'1 ~C1 ·:;~vid .. n(f, l/1 inl:C"l"C'::L, ":;~1-;uc:l ·:,•(F, l/J in!.:i~l·r.;!\\7 1 
1 rr.:n·~'11.t~·c:r~, l/'\ inr.n1·C'.c:r, l"CCt1~"t!\'1~ •;r...~nt<:'lh'!l" ·1,101:<1, Ill 1·,;)r1l: J .I\; h.q}.: )7i.; 
I 
;;,1ni.;'/ ~>0.,09, ::o. Jl1)::? d·'tc•.~ ·,\.1f'u~t-'.l, 1 1)1.'I, fro-:1 ', r.ion }·aciflc !~.ttlro.1d ~:ow .. ".n.v 
1 1.Ji.:~:..·-:·~:': .• ; .... cc'('r..•n, ... co1 .,~~ · .• :~~~dd~n .·:~rl .l<J:in .I. l:c ,h:<..·11, J"l'r;nnlcti \;'.'.'.•LC'r' .... ·1· l3, l'JU', 
, ... 00':\Jt(.,/.·t..'i ...... ~ :!' 1::: :.1rr. 1nt" ·Jcc'.l ::0. ]~~-J.7_c1~1i.:~·<; ",,L·c:1 ::,t<::'lt"1, f1··.:,,'.1 :.nio~ l ,·.~-:li"~c·:t.li_l.l.>1~._d ·..:nl!1Un" tn 1:c11'>1."i:C1 ('; •• :.' ...:ridv!i, (.:cn1:.·~ C. t.c.•c.ic~~" ;1~· . .-J .10~·,n .j. ;~r.dc;cn, :·~'':'.ll.·jc~tl .J1,,;t.c'.'1·~·,lYlr;, in =:rvl: J .it i,1~·c• t.JJ; .lll in ~he n:'.~lC'-' of tllu ::ount.:y ,;~rkr;iq1d iC'c\11·r_'.~l· o·r Su:-:1nit ::ounc::1, ~·l::.1:1. . ~ 
~:~f~! 1\i!;~ :·"- ·.· '' . : . ' ,"'<· 
' .... ~, 1¥.'if;J,' 
;. (".!: . ~. r: ·:· 1 : • ! 
, •, '·'· • , ~c·~ :~ • , ' 
I • >.\ •/ l • ~11 b-• '."{ \'/ ' - '-.,;I '' -
' ~~~"'; I~ 1' }';~[!' -·~ 
\ "· \~-or~ •I~· \ ,. "'' • 
'I 1._:;.\"--.-11?~ .... ir.J::' 1..-',.,:~:' 
\ ·.-~:t~'.:j-~·~:0~1 '~ -~ . ·.· 
,_ :,,·J.:\;,~ ~-:&'L-!~c rJ 1 , ·~ 
t • .'..l~-j!,\},,;t;""~~ }~ • ' 
;·::?4;,~}~~~;~: " 
,, 
/1.1 
·· ...... · . 
.. "''····-· •I"•',.. ,-_\ •• 
i: -;---~ 
I _-;,{,''.\~;J'I··~' ~l · - ~·t'.'r' '. l~ '--. ,it; r ~·· f~t:,~tr · ., 
I ', •.. ' ,'I,~ 
f.' ' .~,,!' 
' .. ,,;:];,· 
I'. : '·j; " 
;.:(/ ~; ! 
: I·.,~. ·r:!! f V 
{ f~~- .\-. -~ ,. ~; ( ·_~?:~1~ 
t - · ·· l' • .· ~ I 
It· · ~:.:··:":, -.; f ~(.( ~. 1 
-. ',;.".'"~-1~1'"":1 ~ ~!' 
-.r.:, :_., ', ~ ,_. 
·:. ,/ .... ·'· ~~': t 
-.. ~ ... 
,• 
'' 
•.. ,.,, "l 7 7 
I" I~ 1.J [. .' .,) 
:_1 
,--- ·, '-' ... ....., I -
,~·-)_;,, :·~-,--<_·'1~~:..\- J"-·' 1 ·~-w.11·-~ .. , ';1~·-0 !"'-: .. '1,~:..,_~u.-.1 !J..,-~d 
, ~~~~--~ ~~~~~c·~1'.:-z·ctn'-:~;--j1·1---z1:--ccr-L;_ij_11 licccl 01· 
- _, 
r. _::in '_s $\ICCC:'",S(Jr in inlcrc:>t to :tll Uic r.i['.ht, ti.1,:;c: <encl 
~-.crest of \.1:1ion }'i:c j lie H~.ilro2.d Cc:.:p2.n:.' in 0.nc: 'co-the ~il 
f:s, and ;;_ssoci2.tccl l:i.c:uid h::<iroca;··;_ic1:1:~ in _ _r...,":~c1 prc111i:';c:; fo1·' ;i, 
fi:n-1 or p 1?riod cciu.--..1 to or e;:cccc.iin~' tJi_c, ~un: of tl1i:; Su:r f<:Cc 
r--·'r 1 s. /;~re ee::\cn t. . ___ .. - -·-_ 
: Ch01:1::ilin nropo:.e:; fi:;:- Cho.1.1;JJ i.n or i.L:.: oc·.cnt~1, lc:--;sccs, 
l
j'.ccn:-.cc:-., s\1ccesc;ccr:., er :~ssisns to pro::;pccl upon 0nc1 o:plorc 
_t:: (\csc;·ibeec.l p1·c1"i:;c:s -~or ',.!1c dcvclo,1;.1c:nt ;~:it1 i1roclvct'.tc•n of oil, 
)r<0, (1.nd c-.ssoc:i.,:.~C:o 1) :'.11i.c.i li;.•c.l1·ocC1fco11 Sl1bs'1 <'.~1ccs c:i tl1c1· on 
f~.:;~1;1lin 1 ~ OC.:ili".J.f or \1!10Cl" or pur;.u;•_r1t to an oiJ. [(Jld f;:1.S J.c·nsee or ~nSc, 01~ unc.lcr or purstit'.nt to ""' 11 \.l!~itizc::.t.·i.on 0Grr.c1:~cnt, 11 Ji1~2.n:in~ ,~re 2.nd \:i1~rcvcr thc.t. tcr1:l is uscc1 he:i:cin C'.11/ opcro.t:i.1i.:: ~[~1"ce1i1cnt, 
!
or ~ny ot)1c1· 2.[,rcc; 1:-·11t covcl'i:1:::; the c:-:pJ or2.tion or clc:vclop:.;C!nt for 
::·the proC:uc'c.i.un of' oil, [;:'.';, or ;::1::;cc:ic1.tcc; Jcq;1_i.tl hyci!'O<'c.rboi!'-, 
any })Coli110, co;:,:.'.1n.i~.ii:<;.t.icir~, unit or oth\:1" C''.·~rcr.in~nt \".1 i1~rc:hy 
ticscrio::cl )Jrc:.1.i.scc; n12.y lJc incl\\tl:·cl ·.;itJ1 c1ti1cr l"nd:; in prc:;.::i.1nity 
1·.:·crc'co o.s n u_ri.i.t 2.l'C!2. \lnclcr n plan of unit c.11· joint c:;:p101'.:1.tior1, 
.c2velokJr.icnt, a!1d opcrl!.tion. 
~:.L.: .. 
J\011, Ti!Ei~EI·'O;-u;;, it is aGrccd as foLL011::;: 
Section 1. ln con:;:ic1cratio:1 of tll~~ 1;1ulu2-l llcne;fj_t;, anc1 
·o~ the sum or Ten Dol l<~rs ( ~~10) p2..i.cl by Cl~:'.1 !il:i n to J.<:ncl Ov:ncr, 
receipt 1:llc-rcoi is hci·cby <cc::no•.-;lcli~-,cd, Lc:nci o-.-:ncr hcrcl1y confi.n1s, 
C%lcncls, nm\ f,1"2-nt:; to Cllo.1.1plin, it:. 2-(',CnU;, 1cs:;ccs, l:i.ccnsi;:e::;, 
;,1Jcce~!.;o:·sJ ~nd o.ss.i..cns, inc1udi:1~ <'..n~' opcr0.i.0r or unit opc.:r[\.~01~ 
:ro111 til.1'! to thic in cil"!T.c 0f oncr;Lt.ion::; urnlcr a uni t:i.Z:LLion 
~:',rccr.1cn'., Z>.ncl lhci_r rc ..... pCcl.ivc ·succc~so:c~ i.l.n(1 ~~;~;:i.c;n:., i...llc cn;.t;iacnts 
'~cl rich';s to cnlcr U!'On t.nc clc:::cri~1cd prc:;1isc'.; .:tnr.l to tlr.i.11, con-
s'.ruct, 1:ic:inL.c.in ;iwi u:;c u~10n, 1-:ith Ln, c.ncl ovc1· :.aid prc1;ri.sc:; ~.ll 
.l "'Clls, C•'.s 1:cll::;, cicrrici:s, rr.2.Cllin~ry, t~:n:::.:, dr).p;;, boiJ.crs, 
,_,incs, pi11c, po·.:cr 2.nci tclcpiionc ljnc:.<;, ru:tcl1·:,0 ys, \·:;~Lcr 1-1ell:::, 
1, \;it'1out li::iit.,'l.tion b~' rca:on of the for.:-e.0i.nc: cnu:11cr.:ttion, 2.llY 
u.11 athcr sLruc(.urcs, cquip!:icnt., fixtures, 2.ppurtcnJ.nces, or 
/ 
J\cv. IJ-1G-n 
..cli'l_...:._:. ;;LI "~'1_· ;L'',\'( bc~n'.', i.n'·~ 1 '~~c1 u:1<~ 1 'r llic: l(:r 1 11 11 fo.c.i.1.)t.i_(:~ 11 ) 
,"~~;2.1·v o · c-,r·. · t.1·.':',t_, 5.;1 p1·0:_;pcc~~.L:1~r. 1tnt1 dr:vL~Jo;1 i11(", for, procl1.1cj_ncr.) 
111.r:J t:-.11·.~,,' r~,;n;' 1 o.nrJ i1:ci.rl:c'vln~. o.i.1, c-.0;,, and a::>:;oc·1..:.-.Lc:d J.j.c1uid 
,, ,;l'l;u:·, :;ll':<:;: :·1":cs 1,;mlc1· 01· prnJuccci fi·c,:n any poi·L,'1,on of tile 
, ',\ic,j p1-c1.ii:,,:s or under or p1·ocJucccl fro1:1 <>.11,',' po1·tion of the unii.t 
,'-" crc:ti..Vl t::1Clc:r :t uni.1..L":tl.i.un ac,rc.::1,1c111.., 1..0c,rLhcr 1::i.1..h 1..ilc r.i.c;hi.. -~ 
rcrnovC! s;,jcJ f.1cill1..ics <i,ncl t.hc ric,ht to u:;,; such 1,1a1..cr ~-~' m<Jybc 
:,:J~d f 1·0:.1 1..h c ci.c sc Li. \.Jell prc:ni,scs, no<; :i.nc lucl.i.1~~ 1-.·a tcr fro111 Land 
c, ,;Cl' 1 S \'.'CJ.ls. 
·Section 2. ChliJ,:~)J.in ~[~rec~.;,. so lon[: as it j.s .. rC:c8ivjne, 
;il o.ncl/01· 1::is prociuc t.i.on fi·o;;i or oj_l anrl/or r,c:~: roy.~ 1, de::; uoon 
Jcluction .c'ro11\ tl1C clcscriliccl p::croisc::; (l:C alloc:~,'l,C;d tlicrcto under 
1;he prov is:i.onS 0f D. Ulli tiz.0,tion O.P;rc;c111ent ,,,.-to r,::cy Ol' C.'.'.\l.SC; to be pa:i.d 
to lhc I..,:.ncJ CJ· 1~c~1=2_1_si,sl~. U1c valw: on t~-." J;ll'Ct11 i~:-._r:_r;_r.l_f_\,i;.r~_i!JJcl onc-l1:ilf 
; ;;_i:r~S'J-1..LLUJ_;:;.L[.Q[-"""-1.L!]1_c o i Lnncl_:::.r.~"'..U.r.1_0.:i" or:j 2_t_e:cLliQ uj.cl_l1:" cii:.o.-
' c:rb~M; _l~~_r,:::,~0::e>( __ p1·oclucc_ci., s""vcc1., <-.ncl w"rl~ctccl thcrcfi·o1:1 or alloco.ted 
~crcto ns oforc~ulcl, cxccpL c\1 and ~ns oncl nssociatccl liquid 
~yclroc.:i·bons ur~cd in OJ1Cj'·".'c.i on:; on the µ;·c:111.L:.;r~r: or ur:crl unclc:c Lhc 
uniti.zation v.:~;·ccc,,:cr1'~~ .. 11rl C:):c;cpt tl:at .:s to cci.r:in[:hc:1,d r:a,-.olinc 
I n::d 0U1cr f1rodw;:.\.::,-1,1::11ufact\Jl"Cd i'i-0:11 cas there sl1;cll be~ dccluctccl 
I
' the co~ t ~; -;;:-.:>.nll f ::~ turc; provi.cl eel, . hol':c_vcr, tlli\ t clui-:i.nr: _any ~imc 
th~"cr1bccl pi·cmJ r;c;. or iC.llY port.Lon tnccrcof ,u·c inclt1C.1crl \'i1tllln 
Vthc bounc1;~1·ic::; of ri, p2,rtic),pn,_tinc;, pooled, or CCli"1uuni ti;1,cc.l nre.:i., 
! (to l':h).ch incll1sic•11 L.'.1.ncl 0','ncr cxpre::;sly consent;.) <:.ncl tl1ccrc is no 
provii;icm fo:r tile p;1y11w:1t of roy<J.lti c:s to Cii.J:.ipJ i.n but ).'c ]"<Jrt:i.cipates 
' in the rirc,ciuct .. i.on [1·0!11 tl1c poolc:cl, co1:,;1111r1i t:i.;,,l'cl, OJ' \lit'; t area ar:: 
a 1:urlt.i.11G jntcrc~;t. 01 ncr, th<.'n the 1..1:0 i'.nd onc··l1::ll' percent (2 l/2~~) 
above set forth .slin.11 be a:n))J.iccl to th<>,t pcrccnti'[.'.C of the total 
prolluction from such area 1·:llicl1 is al.located to tile clc~:cri\.Jccl 
prc1aiscs. 
Hilcn proct1,1c'cion of oil f1·01i1 l.:tnd:; unctcr scvcr<Jl surface 
O',:nersllips is co;:,;.d.nr;lcrl in on~ central t0,nl~ sctlins for pro.ct.ic'11 
opera tine: rc;,::;ons, per .i.ociic j_nrlivi.clual 11cll tc::; Ls 111n.:r be m:'.clc to 
cc."9u'c:c 1..hc q1lan'c.,i.tics of CU:71:11inr,lcd oil properly <:.lloce>,\.Jlc to 
cilch i1cll, and the t'.;o 2,ncl one-half percent (;'. J/;;~~) pay:11cnt 
pro·r.idcd hcrci.n sJ10.ll be p,o.y<:iJlc upon the qu:int.J,1..i.cs ;:,P!'Ortioncd 
to c::i.c;h Hell as rcpoi·tccl to CJ1.c:11~1li,n in full se.tisfo.ction of the 
obli13ations of Ch;::,1plin unJ.c:c this Sect.ion 2. 
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Sccu,m j. .'Jl\oulcl the cJc;.c-i:.i.11c-cl iwc1ni[;cf; or o.ny portion 
·IJ[ ,,t p.n,'>'. tj_111c 'uc r:01111n.LLtcci to :i. uni.tj;.;n.~ion ::i.r·.recmcnt, the 
i , ,,1..01· or 111.J. l. 0pcr: .. tn1· unclc:1· sucl1 O(',l'CC'l1\('l1l. 111;1y C):crc:l,;c the 
I .,·:,ts ('.l'O.n.~.ccl 11.lHIC'l' 0c:c c.i.C>ll l llc:J'eof dur:i.ll(' t.hc per.i.od c.:nd:i.n;.~ 
.. :h the :f).ft.i1 coJ.cnc.l:u· year folJ.ci:·;.i.nr, the ·uc.tc of th:'Lf: (l.Gree111cnt. 
;cho11t coinren:;11.t:i.on to the Lo.nrl 01-:ncr otl1cr ·Lh.:tn )''":;1nc11t n.s .:t'uove 
";roviclcll,. but '1.fter :;2.:i'.d period :i.f ;;uch opc.:r;~tor ~:110.ll inr.tall or .. · 
::i.ntn.in''.:i.:ciy facili 1.i.cr: otl1c,1· ti1n.n l'ipe or pcile l:i.ne'; upon the .-
;coC :rj.1i erl :·p1-c1:1:i.:; cs clur .i nc o ny c;,lcnclo.r yea;·, it sll.-i.11 p.:i .. Y L.:tnd. 
;.:nwr:'Oni,; "DoJ.1:.tl' ( ~:1. 00) pci· .:tcrc f(ll' j.llt~ rtci·cac.<~ 11;.ed cluri:·1r. 
'iny' pJ.rt,of tl1at c.-i.lcn<iar yc:ar, if :;ucl1 u:.;e su11,,t:tnt:Ln1.3.y dep;·tve:; 
::i;c .Lane\ 01·nic:r of :t,Jie use.: of such acrco.f',C. 'l'l1e D.l.:,t>vc a.hount of 
~e DolJ.rtr.(~l.00) per ucrc shall.be subject to up~~rcl rcvisiori 
18on ·a :; hO\tinc; by the L.~.ncl 01-:nc,,· tiio. t the· ·land in vol vcd has · 
:i1eretofor.e c<irned and is C2.f>O.blc of ,e<i.l:ninc . .:'.. c;rc.:i.;~er stun per acre. 
J. • '· • ~(f·. ''.~~«:: . . 
, ~-.· · ·.Seet1.on il. ~!otb:in[; r::.::rc:Ln contD.incd Sh<J.11 be constr~ecl 
.r.s'n.'covcnant to dr:i.11 by C~1ainplin, its 01.e;ents, lessees, liccnr.ccs, 
~ccessors, or assiGnS:· Dr by any operator or' unit operator, or as 
a Gntnt ·to .Land 0110::/ ol' o:Ll or e;a:; rie;hts or rie;bts in other 
as:;~~in~ed 'liC'.'..:.·.i.c1 hyclroc<i.r'oom;. "· . :. ,, . 
, ,· J·'{· I \_ ,,_,.,,., 1,l ~,. · , · •·· . ~ ;, ·•· ·: . - '";-•~ ·- •.. 
..:.--:-· -.; Scct:ion 5. Ci10.111;1l.in,. its acent.o:;, lessees, 1.i.ccnr.ees, 
sticces:;ors ,' anrl <i.ssign;., j.nclud:Ln[~ the opC'r~to:c or unit operator 
un1lcl" a uni t:Lza:U.on acn:cm1~nt, sh:iJ.l be r,::qt1ircd: (a) to pay 
fol'· all' damacc to L.:llid O•:ne:c' s l<~ncls, bu.i.lrl:i.11::.~, .:i.ncl c;ro11).ng crops 
· causc.:d by the ercctio:ci (IT construction of f~cilitics to be used in 
connection with oil or ens or associn.tcd liqtdd hydrocarbon 
,'opcr<i.tions; (b) to bury o.11 pipe l.i.ncs belo1·: plol'I de:Jth \·;here such 
.1ine~,cross cultiva~ed lane\; 2.nd (c) to construct Gates or at its· 
I
, option 'instnll-c&.t.t.le l'.u.::.rcls 1·1here necesso.ry for cros:;:i.nc; fenced 
: land in conncc ti on 1·:i th explor.::. ti on, develop1;:cnt, or produc inc; 
opcrat:lons nnd, 1·1l1erc <'11 election h~s been rnaclc.: to construct (',ates 
, in lieu of.cattle r;t1.:1.rds, to keep sucll e;<i.tcs in rcpair'and closed. 
1 ' I\ ! • LI ~ ' ' 
( ,;: ,;·Section 6. Other th.:tn the pc.yments to be 1~ncle as o.fo1·e-
[ "said, tl1c Lane\ 01·mcr sho.ll not be enU.tlcd to any other or additionJ.l 
L paymcn ts .as a result of tbe concluc t of operations upon the described 
premises.·; · . I . "'.-; ', -~I,'·!~ . 
, · · f: -.~ SectJon 7. ,Sul',ject to tlie provir.i0ns of S!~CtioQ..-9 
~__(_, it io, (\('J'CC(l tlli.Jj;_iht __ C_QU:l)'\lllr'!-1;0_n.'.1.Y_thc :;u111s P?:OV;i,~1£Lln. 
SccUm1:; 2. 3, ;ind 'i llCl"Cl!}' sl1;•,1J,__bc, COY,~!J~llt~ T\~f1JLl..DLL.l:!:~tJ1Jl)e_. 
~ o'.mer:;JJi n of the; clc:.c1·ibecl _prc1,d.se:: D.ncl sh.-i.J.l not. be held 
OLJ..r:..:ulli.f~..l.LJ;s.u;t ro. Le ly ti1crcfrom ,Ql1(l on~l ::;ti:~~-µn y:JI11§~~'J5s!.t·!~ 
l_hi:; ac;1·c;emc11t slin.ll be po.icl to tlic person or pe!'s~~ oi:·ni!:i_~_!;_h_e f· ourr.:i.c_e 01~ the descriucd pn:rnis~.s .:t!.i of the cL:tt"Cl:he oTI or c;:i.r. 
f
. . ,~·:: ... ':·' i :; :· 
. :. _' . . :'' ;· 
I <i;'·'.:"_''._!/ , :· Hf)()\(\{13:~ p[1.:1(:) iJ 0 
. ~ ,: ' 
I 
,''•I 
·,. ~..... ·~> ; ·~ . 
:;::.t : ' ~ - -. .-.. l~ 
,,c-.socio.L'·ll J [n 1.1 i..cl h"c1roC<1.r'.Jr1n nruclucl'i..011 i:; 111:'.l'l;ctccl. Champlin 
, l l net,: 1101.·cvcT, \Jccoc~c obl.i.[';:1.t.vcl to rnaLC' such p:1.yll\cnt:; to nny 
· 'c'lllC.'1t ]'Ul'C'h:.t::Cl' of tilr. clc:;c.;1·:i.1'r;cJ prr.1ni.::;c;:; 0.11<1 ~;\J;1.ll cont:i.nuc 
:11;i.ke such po.y1.1cnt:.: to the J.nncl O•::ncr unLD. the~ fi.r:;t. dav of the· 
nt11· f.ollo":j_n(; tht: rccc:i.pt, by Ch~c111plin of notice ol' ch.i.nc:c of 
:1cr;;hi;1,~;con::;istinc; of the 01·:i..c;:i..n:i.J. or ccrtif:Lccl copies of th0 
'r.:;trumcnt' 01· in::;tru1~ct1ts con:;t.).tut:i.nf' a co: .. 1plctc cho.:i..n' of t:i.tlc 
~~D the' Lan<1 Owner to the p:i.rty clo.iminG such ownership, and then 
only. a.~,q,~o;~r<~ym~1.1ts tl1crc.:i.ft~1: _rn.:i.ll.::. . . 
r,,l,' ':\ ~ . 'l --~~ · 
·. ,··. ·:.,section 8. 1'hc l:!.:i.sc;nents, f'iL'.l1tr.:, .:i.nd u,,cs b::rcin sl1:i.11· 
be b).nclinc; ·ujlon tl1e clesci·i::icd µi·c1r.ises <i.ncl co.ch r!::i r:.vcry pc.rt 
thcr0of ; .. an<l the present a.rid fu ~urc 01-merc t.k:rcof. ancl shLi.11 · 
'.continuc· for the benefit of the pi·cDcnt o~· fuLurc O\mcrs of· the 
r.oil <lncl/or c;o.s. nncl/or n:;cocii1.tc:cl liquid bycl_;·ocnrbon 1·ic;ht.s. in the . described prc:1,u.scs anrl. co.ch ancl cvr::l·y part tlH;rcof urn! thc:i.r 
.~aecnts, J lessees, liccn~cc:,, suce:c~s::;o:ts, o.nd D.Sfj)f~nt;, incltHl:i.nr; 
.any opg_rat,or or unit o;w!·nt.o;·, e.ncl fci;,.· t11c bq1cfit of othcr l<lnds 
11iihin ~i.ny' un:L·i; .:i.rc~a 1·!i1:/1in' i·!h:i.ch t11e der;cr:i..1icd prei:iises, or any 
portion· ,therc::llf ma~' -tc ·inc ludcd, - and each nncl every part thereof. 
. r.'.' ,". . 
'" ... : 1 Section 9. 'l'l1is ac;rccm<::nt slrn.11 be in full force and 
,c[['Gct from' and e. ftcl' exect1tion o.ncl deli vc,ry ancl shall ce>r1U.nue 
·~ full force and eff~ct for n period of one (1) ·ya~r and so 
lone; thcrcn.ftcr ac the oil L1.ncl c;il.:.l ric;hi..s in the clc~:;cribecl 1we1a:ises 
arc cq:r,mittccl to an oil nnd c;as lc2se oi:: licen:;c or to :i. unitization 
acrccmcnt; or so lonr; nc a Hell C<•)1<1.ble of proclucinc; oil or c;;i.s or 
.. associated liqui~ hydrocarbons is located upon the dc~cribccl premises, 
.. or tlr:ilJ.inc; or re;:or};i111'. opr.i·ations nrc bcin::; conch>.ctcd thc1·eon, 
·anc1,,,'upon! terrn:i.nat:ion of such lease, license, or m1itizntion ac;1·ce-
.·ment; Ool\ upon ·nba.ruloruncnt of such 1·1cll, or upon ccs::at).on of sucli 
drillin:(. or rc11or:~j.n[_; opcro. tiont>, 1·!l1ichcvcr last occurs, this 
·or;rccmcnt sh;::ll tennin.:i. te; provldcd, ho· .. 1evcr, tho. t. such tcrmin2.tion 
. shall nci t11c1· affect nor tcn:1inntc the r:i c;ht~;, c:xprcsscd or impl:i.cd, 
·~the 'd0cd or deeds rcfcrrcd to in the Recitals hereof. · 
'i i' • I ~ ... ' • 
·.: \ ·
1·scction 10. S~Jject to the provisions of Sections 7 
and 9 ·hereof, this ac;rccnicn t sll~ll inure to t\Je bcncfi t of and 
ibc binr(inc; u;ion the pnrt:Lcs he1·cto and tllc:ir re spec t.ivc heirs, 
·cxc_~~to:L:s," aclministr.:i.tors, succ~ssor:;, and nssic;n!.i. 
' . . •. '. \ " .,. :. I • ' .. • , 
I·'· "'*-<.-!. :_ . - c;.1:1.:h.f~ 
f of tl1c .. nbovc-nar.1cd L.i.nd-01::'i1c·r, tioc:; hcrcll:\;_~-11i.:Z,fr-1yJr1iUf.uancl 
ln tlic .cxccu t.ion of thr. f0.J,:.'.'·-o' n:: :r;-:rc:ciii'C'n t, hereby rclcar;:i..n~ .:tnd 
";·1ivj.n~1~110f.iC:;tcad nnd do· .. 1cr in and to the lands n'oovc· 
r I"t";. Ill II m:E SS. l/ llEJll':OJ', tho par'"' '""do ha v'' ex" u t otl t "'' 
:~ ' -~~~?~ '' 
1, ·"'.:·· .. :1 :: 
I . . : .... · .. 
- 5 ---
1 --r.:;,-:'; L:Y. Ll-lC-'(.I. 
'· 
cctocni, as of 1,l1c day ,,ncl YC<t!' f.i.n;t nl1ovc wr.i.1, Len. 
• ~ 1 
.-
r,I 
~ '·. ·' 
·t,~ .;. 
1 ,,~ '.'!-
:_. .. 
. ~111'.HPLHI l'ETHOLEUi 1 COl•lPJ\i'IY 
,. 
,,;''-' _c:..'>.:..:...l·..;··;.:;r''-''-"-''-'1-.· "'i '-'-'-'1-----.::.-J-•.!.1 "10L~-l..I .;.•.;.;··;.:· •.:;•·.:;·--
_)~'· )'?d~tf/_. )11 )'!!<c/¢;·v 
· l'l"oi.!5.l<lcnt i,, 
'. . ~ 
.,._ 
. -
. .. ' . 
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:· 
••r I 
< ., , . 
l) n i' \'' '- '· "I 
I /\L'. ·• '·: t... 
r' ~ 
'·' ' 
GOR rOii.f\'i.'E i\G IG:Q\·.' LSDG~iEN'l' 
Ii .. ) uto::orr~1cz: Ar> . • : ·· . ) SS 
~?'u~~:.;.~F:f-: ·";. , .l ·, Y- _. . 
t•~: : ~~~'~)/<.";~·:th·~~ . -; l/ day of/:'6 ,~j:_. , 19_·1_1 _; '.Joforo I: .: · ·,,. .. ,... . : ·· .. ./ -
li;::L.:::;~: p:::~:: (?:.".\::~ ;;'~~::';~ ln :h;, ":: ':,::::::::·· ~ow~1 .and. to mo porsonafly known t~ bo th~ President of '. . . H~R~;i ~ .' NE'HON & so;is SHEC:P i:.uf:PANY and to bo tho 
F ; I ]1 .. ---.'.·---· 
f.su1,s·.:po~~-~~·Hhoso .. no:-:.o ·is .s.ubsc.l'_.~bod to '.;ho forosoing in:;trwr.ont, 
r~~~}~.uing by.mo dulys110.rn,.did say that he i:J tho 
rProsidcnt ;or snid Gornpc.ny; that tho ocnl a.ffL':od to said instru:r.ont is thc)··~;or~o~~to .:io:il of so.id Corporation; and that :;:.id instru:.:ont 
!.w.as .sir;.·~:G~:·.r.nd :ionled on behalf of s·o.1d coi•po11•at.:~_n.., b: ... c.1uth:i'.;y '7of Ho. Doo.i·d of Diro::tor:i; and the so.id'!/? .. <If 7,z ci·, <:·- .• 11 '"'·,~~· r")ll. • · • 1 c> / facl:nowl~de;od onid-:1.notrumont ·to bo his fi•oo 'and voluntary act nnd 
f, ·d~oa:;·and: tho froo_ and voluntary·act and dood of said Corpo.-o.tion, 
I , i· by it vo~ur:.to.rily _oxocutod, foi· tho uoos spocifiod thoroin. 
· · ,. ; . ·. IN \·IITNESS \1'1iEREOF, I hnvo horoun'.;o sot iny hand nnd 
t. offl,cio.~:··:;:c:il tho clay a.nd yos.r o.bovo writ ton. 
I ' . . .... ., .. 
f '. 
,. ·: >',: ~. 
·,:·.· 
Corr.ml s :ii 011 
• • :~,· t 
DQQl' ~.' "i. 71 u ,, 111.J.-· 
.,,___ 
Tbb dHd dated fabtuary 1, 1972, .c 
I. Partie• and Intereat• Con!ey•d. 
llEllI'ON SHEEP CDIPAllT, 
A Llaited Patturabip 
3744 SO\lth '400 "-C 
Sale Lau C1c7, llcab 14120, 
lleraf.D called tha C:r•tor, iD coaaid•rat1ot1 of clle - of Ta - llora Dou.re, 
.1~ hand paidc and other COD91dera~ion. doea bertb7 ~-t. bal'l•iD, Mll, CODYey, 
trmu:fet, •••1p and .cl•l1 .. r mato1 
llASS E!ITEIU'llnli PllODUCTIOlll CO. 
1211 Fort Vort:b Kat1onal a-Ir. lu11Al1D& 
fort Uordl, Tmcaa, 
herein called tha C:rantH, tha interHt• deocril>ed 1D ..,bparaaraph A. of tbiD 
pausrapb I, lo 1111bpara1raph I. of thla paracraph I, and la •ubparaaraph c. of 
th1• paraaraph 1. 
L-4636 
A. Fee Landa. 
1. AD undhided 1/2 lnterHt lo -d to all of tha oil, IH aod other 
.tnarala lo and andar and that -:o be produced froa tha follovtna 
daacrlbad land• aituated 1D S.-it Count7, State of Utah, ~-tt: 
SEE EXHIBIT .A .. ATTACHED, SICNED FOR l.D£::TITICAno11 AND IlfCORPOllATED 
llEREIN BY REFERENCE · -
tocathar vith the .rtihc of in1reH and '"S"•H at all u .. a for tha 
purpoH of oparatin1 and d.,,.lopin1 Nid laoda for oil, aaa and 
ocher ainerala, and •arketins cha - therafroa vith the rishc to 
r...,,• froa aaid landa all of C:rant .. • a properer and impr.,,._ca, 
lncludio& cha ralaaae and vat,,... of cha ri&ht of "-•taacl. 
Thia c"'"'ayanca ia -d• llUbjacC Co anr ri&hta - niactoa co 
any laaH• or aaaiana uodar any Yalid and aobabtins oil and &•• • 
laaaa of record baratofor• aacutad; it baio& underatood aod asr-• 
that add Grant .. ahall have, HCaiYa and anj07 Cha baraio sraotad 
andiYidad f.DcarHt lo aod co all -u•••· noca, roralctaa ll1MI 
ocher l>aoafica vhicb -r accrue uodar clle ca .... of aaid laaM 
lnaofar aa it conra Cha aboYe daacril>ad laDd froa and &fear Cha 
dace hereof, pracbelr •• if cha Graot•• baraf.D ·had l>a• ac clle 
dace of tbe .. kin& of aaid luae the ovnar of a aiailar 1111d1"1dad 
1atareat iD •Dd to th• land• deacribed and .Grut .. oaa of tbe 
l•••Dr• tbereia. ·· ... · : · 
2. Subj•ct to the apacific tmr• of parasnpb 11 i.er-f, and escape 
for th• land• daocribad in aobpansrapll I. (Exhibit •1• atcacbad), 
it ta Cha apacific intent of the Graotor baraio CO CDOYa1 a 1/2 
•ioaral ioc .. eat in all lands -•d br th• C:raotor 1D the foll-
iD& covnabipa located lo 5-it Couocr, Ocab1 
T_.hip 1 llorth, KaD1• 7 Eaac 
Tovnohip 2 North, !Ian&• 7 Eaat 
Townohip 3 North, Ian&• 7 Eaat 
TDWDship 1 llorth, la•&• 6 Eaat 
TOVftll~ip 2 llortb, Ian&• 6 Eaat 
Jc ta apaciflcall1 undaratood chat no iotereat of •"1 type 1D the 
landa deacribed in aubparasraph I. bcraof ta CDDYef•d andar tbe 
unu of Chia aubparasrapb A. 
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I. Onion Pacific: bilroad CO!IJ?any Uind•.· 
One-half of the .:0,.alty (of any t:rp•) fro. production of mineral• cbac 
the Cr•ntor actually receive•, or 1a entitled to rectift util February l• 
2072, fro• the followiq ducribed 1-d• . · 
S!:E EXHIBIT •an ATTACHED, SICNDI FOll IDElmne>.nOR AND lllCORPOllATED HEREIN IT 
llltFERL;ICE. 
· la addition to tbe epeci!ic _.....,.u .. of paraarapb IV lier.of, Che 
C:rantor, aa a rul CGY......C, apec1ficall7 c-ca that the intereac ~ 
in tb18 aubparasrapb I. CDftatitutu a -t...i c-c rmmini vitb tba 1-d 
dncrikd on EaJUbit .... , and •ll •accns1'99 future owner• of the 1ateraat 
conveyed under th• pr""taiona of Cbia aubparasrapb i., ahall ·ba,,. the· ri;bt . 
co 1-ou and eaforc• iu pr""1a1D1U1 aa the .0>:1&1nal aip•ra Ciiento. . 
c. Preferential light of PurcbaM. 
After tba data of ciu. deod, 1a tb• ....,t cbac tba Crntor racebu 
and jntenda to accept a "Dona fida offer for tb• purcbaa• of ,,,.,. intareat in 
either tha minerala or tba ri&bt to recd ... r07alt7 (of ...,. type) _.. or 
acquired by th• Crantor, in tba follovi.D& t-.bip• located in S-1t C-t7, 
DtAb, 
T-abip 1 llorcb, llana• 7 Eaat 
t-abip 2 Horeb, It.nee 7 Eaat 
t-.hip 3 !torcb, llana• 7 Eut 
t-ahip l Nortb, lbns• 6 Eaat 
T-bip 2 llortb, laqe 6 Eaat, 
or any part thereof or interut therein, froai • person .. firm or corpor•cion. 
re•d7, able and villina; to purcluiae any interest 1a aitber cba min•rala or 
th• ri&ht to racaive royalty (of an7 type) -•d or acquired b7 tb• Crantor, 
part thereof or intere•t therein, the Crantor i:=ediately shall pve vritttm 
notice th,reof to th• Crantee. includin& in aaid notice the nana and addreaio 
of •uch off•ror, the price offered and all other pertinent tera. alMI cn-
ditiona of the offer. Tb• Crantee, for a period of lS daya after tb• receipt 
of •aid notice, •hall luiv• tbe prior .,.. preferred ri&ht and option co 
purchaa• fr- th• Crantor, en7 inc•rut in dtber the min•rala or "tb• ri&bt 
to receive ro7alty (of an7 type) -d or acquired Irr tba Crantor, or tba 
part thereof or interest therein, covered Irr aaid offer at th• prtc• and 
accordin& to the teru and conditiona apecifiad in aaid offer; prD91ded, 
tut, 1f th• Crantee fail• to aerci•• iu aaid richt and option 1'7 1inn1 
vrittm node• of it• acceptance vitbin. lS daya after receipt of Che U...e 
.. acioned notice, th• Crantor aball accept aaid offer and complete Aid ula 
in accordance .qcb aaid offer vitbin 60 daya after the upinotion of aaid 
period of 15 da7a; and pr""1d .. , further, tluit if tba Crantor faila to accept 
aaid offer or to complete Hid aale vitbin Aid ·period of 60 daya, tbe pr-
ferred riaht and optioD of cbe Crat• under this peracrapb aluill 1te con-
aidered .. revived, and th• Crantor aball not cosplet• aaid sale co .. u 
prospective purc.heser unle•• and until a.aid offer a1a1D ha.a Hea preaatU 
co tb• Crant .. , ea bareinabov• pr""1ded, _. the CrantH apin baa failed co 
elect to purcha .. on th• tenu .,.. condition• of aaid offer. All offer• ac 
any time .. de to the Cra:ntor, it• •ucc•••ora, hail'• and ... isu. for tba 
purcluiH of ...,. interHt in the mineral• or tbe ri&bt to recd,.• royaltJ 
(of eny c:rpe) --4 or ec:quirad Irr tba Crancor, or ...,. part thereof or 
1ntereat tb•re1n, shall M aubject to all tbe t•raa mld cond1tioaa of th1a 
parasrapb ""til .Jauary 1, ZOU, at vbicb ciae tba obliaattona of tbia 
P8racrapb ahall c ... a. 
II. llH•rvedon of Coal. 
Tber• 1a epec1Ucally excepted and r .. en .. fr.,. tbia 1rant, all of tbe 
inureat Crantor -. in the coal (and tbe ri&ht to recd,,. r07alt7 of an7 type 
from coal production), on eny landa ducribed on Exbibita "A" and "B" attached 
bereto~ The Crantor further exc:ept• and reserve• the rl1ht to uplore for or 
ain• co•l, and to arant to parties other tb.aD th• C:rantee, lu1e1 cnetin; coal. 
L-4636 
(2) 
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Ill. Cener•i .. 
A. Crantor relaaoaa the ri&ht of ho.eotood. 
I. Th!lre 1• conaideratiOD fOT thi• deed. 
C. Cra~tor as;reea to eaeea:te a~cb further aaau.rancea aa .. , H reqviait• 
for tho full and complete ajoyment of tho rilihto herein 1rantod, and l1k-1H 
•ar••• that Cran~•• herein 1Ull baTe th•. ri&ht at any t.iae to red•- for aaid 
Cran tor &, p.yiaaut, •1 110rtc•c•. ~•• or other li•u • tb• abne described 
land, ilpon default in pa,,....t "1 Cran tor, and be oubrocatod to tba rlchta of 
the bolder thereof. • 
IV. . llorranty. 
To U.. and co bold th• a...,.. d•~1!»ed propeny vith all ad oinsular the 
rishto, pr1"1lo1u and •pin.rt.......,•• tharaunto or in ...,.n .. l>olon1in1 to the uid 
"Cra.otee herein, it• heir•, auccaaaora, personal rapreaenutivea, adaia.iatratora, 
executor• and aaaipa forn•r, &!Ml C:rantor does hereby varrant uid Utla u 
Crantn, it.a heir•, aecutora, adainiatrators, person.al repreantativu, auccuaora 
and aH11na for.,,or, and doea honby asrH to defend all and ainsular tb• u1d 
property at-;> Ula aaid CrantH herein• it• heir•. auceeeora. uecutora. personal 
repreaancaci,,.. and ua11no a1alnat .., • ..,. peraoo vb-ner clat.iDa or to claia 
the •- or 8117 part thereof. 
'f. ~-
Notic•• required under the ...... of tbu dead. .ui1 'b• elven to tba pans .. 
at tho addroHH ohown in para1rapb 1 hereof. 
DATED February 1, 197%. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
> ... 
COUllTY OF SALT l..u:E) 
On Febl'l!ary 1, 1972, personally appeared l>afore •• .. Iph M. -Oii 
General Partner for 11..,too ShHp C:O.pan7, a limited partnenhip, that aip.-d tba 
above ln•t..-nt, vho duly acknovlad&ed lD • that b c tad the ne 
.. 
.,., 
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EXHl811 ">." ATTAC11Ell s1c:1[!l roll lDrnTirtCATIO~ A.~ lNCOllPOIU.TCD IT llETEllENCE 
Tovnsliip 1 tlorth, l•n'i~ 7 bat, St.'I 
Section 4: S~°'; S~'IO'!s 
kction 6: Lota 1, 2, 3, 4 
Township 2 North, hn115• 7 bit, SU1 
Sectioa 4: Lot l; SJ,.•°'; Sti.,\"\J'r,; Nt'r.SW't; SEil; EXCEPT 13.4 acre• descrii...I 
aa l>e11DD.inc at • point South l,6l4.16 feet and Eaat 1,SOS.11 
fHt fr- ~ coruer of u1d Section 4, thellce Soutb 34°17• Eaot 
221.2 hot; thHCO lorth aa001• East 276.6 fHt; th ... c• Mortb 
10°2a• VHt 742.5 feet; t1a ... ce llortb 79oza• Vut 291.38 feet; 
tbeoce llorth 74°41' V.at.471.79 fHt; thence South 35"22' W.at 
Sll. 75 fHt; tb ... ce "" a 7030• cane co tba dpt tbrou1h aa 
arc of 606. 7 f ... c to "l>e1111Df.Aa. . 
S.cUou 61 Lota 3, 4, S, 6, 7; """"Wis; ElsSW'c; IEls 
Section I: ill . 
Section 16: ill 
Sectiou 18: Lota 1, 2, " 4; IWI; 
.,. 
Section 20: ill 
S.ctiou 22: Lota 1, 2, 3, 4; SliNll; Sit 
Section 28: AU 
S.ctfop 30: Lou 1, 2, 1; 4• . Elf.Ill; Els 
Section 32: ill 
Sactiou 34: All 
Tovnah1p 3 llorth 1 I.ans• 7 teat, SUI 
Sectioa 30: EltSVl . 
Sactfoa 32: 11i,111.1'; ALSO, l>e;1nnins •t th• SE coruer of S~'llll(, tbenc• 
Vest 160 rods; thenca South 160 rods; Uezu:a North 45° Eaat 
226 rods to placa of l>e1inn1Jl1. 
Section 34: ~; S~~Vl; ~; SUlcS~; ~ 
Townohfp l llorth, lanu 6 E.ast. SUI 
S.ctioD 2: Lota 1. 2. 3. 4. 5, 6, 7, I, 9, 10, 11, 12; 51-
Tovnahip 2 North, Ian;• 6 East, SUI 
Saction 12: ill 
Section 24: !1,t\i; JlllldfE!c; lftli.'l\o4c; S.:'dVl A.";D ALSO a tract coatalaina 57 .67 
acraa described aa bccinainc at th• Sis comer of add SoctiDll 24, 
thence Nortb 89°26' Vest 0.52 chains; theuce North 18°13' Vest 
.. 1.60 chain•; then•• llortb so0 s6' 11 .. c 12 chafna; &bane• llorth 
2"30' lleat 2.40 chains; thence llortb 26°27' lleat 4.70 chains; 
thenca llorth 23°10• V.at l chain•; cb ... ce Worth 22°s6' lleat 
4.50 cheina; thence Nortb 19°38' lleat 3.10 chains; theuce llortll 
30"32' VHt 3.60 cbaiAa; thence llortb 24°23' lleat 11.30 cbaiu; 
thence Worth o0 so• llaat 1.40 cbaiu; thellce Worth 43o43• V.at 
1.30 choina; thence llortb 39o42• lleat 1 chain; ch-ce llorth 
34°3• llut 0. 70 chains; tbeace llortb 56°20' Vest 0.30 cbaina; 
tbeaca Worth 32°31 • lleat S.30 chains; tb•nce Worth 31°2' lleat 
1.90 chains; thence Worth 3o3• lleat I.SO chains to WE corner 
of SVl<ll".llt; thence East 20 chains; thence Sovtb 60 cbaiu to 
point of l>•1ianin1. 
S.ctiou 36: le;inninc at cha n··coraer of add Section 36, t.,_ce South 
alou; th• Sect ton Una 80 cbain• to SE corur of said Section 
36; thaace I/eat alone th• Section line ~o the Sii coi:aer of 
-1d Section 36; thence Jlorch alon; the S•ctioa 11.D• 20 chd.D•; 
thence lortb 77°33' teat 53.40 chains; theaco lortb 28°S2' 
teat 10 chains; thence llortb 1°03' Veat 40 chaiu to th• Sectf.oD 
Un•; tbeace E.aat aloaa th• Sactioa line 2S.3J cbaiu to 
lte;1DD.in1. 
1-1t Count7, Utah 
Contaioinc 9316.04 Aer .. , 
Hore or Leaa. 
1r4636 
A Lia1 ted Partaerabip 
:n•&:p-A ht~ 
General Partner 
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EXHIBIT "II" ATTACHED, SICllED FOR IDE:rrlnCATID:> A:m l:ICDRPORATD> gy llFEll.EllCE 
Tovn•hlJ! 2 North, ltanR• 7 Eaot 1 SUI 
Section 7: 1.Dts l, 2, 3, 4; Elsi/ls; Els 
Section ,,. All 
Section U: All 
Section 171 All 
Section 19: Lota 1, 2, 3, •• llPI; Els 
Section 21: Lota 1, 2, 3, 4, S; S&\l!Elt; &WI(; ~."" lecUon 27: All 
Section 29: Lota 1, 2, 3; 4, S; SEl:.Wc; Siii:; tlsM; SEil 
Section 31: Lota 1, 2, ), 4, s, 6, 7; $lsl1E%;. SEJc,~; 5'sSll!s; "" .. ctioa Jlt All 
Township 3 Rorth 1 ltan;e 7 Eaot, SL'f 
Section 19: lei;iDDin& at the Sii corner of SectiOD 19 0 tbenca liortb 
aloni; section line 2,640 feet; East 4639. 7 fHt; South 
12°3S' lleat 300 fan; South 4D°S3' lleat 393.76 faet SoGth 
· 49°28' llut 333.73 hat; South 37°so• WHt 288 faat South 
3°48' East 1S4.4 faet; South 13°2S' West 317.0 faac; 
Section 291 
Section 31: 
Saction 33: 
South 42o33• lleat.316.0 fHt; South S7°39' WHt.196.6 feet; 
· South 2s0 s9• lleat 26S.3 feet; South 24°St' WHt 192.2 feet; 
So11th 26°04' llaat 261.7 feet; South 0006' East 153.21 feet 
to South line of Section 19; thcce I/eat 3,114.46 faet to .. ,f.lmiD,. 
s-~ 
Els of Section 31, lus 4S.91 acre• in 2 exceptiona. 
All 
To..-nship l North 1 ltange 6 East, SUI 
Section 1: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6, 7, I, 9, _10, il, 12, 13, 14; lllsSElc; S\llc 
Tovnship 2 North, Range 6 Ean, Sl.'f 
Section l: Lota l, 2, 3, 4; S's-~i,; Sit 
Section 13: aea1nn1.n; 12.4$ cha1~ South 8i039' Emi•t of. r.: corner of ·.::;.... 
Section 13, thenca North 17"42' WHt 40.01 chains. oilorth 
40 chains; South ago31 • East 79.S <:Mina; South 80 chains; 
•orth 89°39' lleat 66. 7S chains to be&iDDiD&• • 
Section 2S: 132.83 acrH in r.c:I( of Section 2S, 142.1 acres in E's of 
Section 2S 
Conta1n1na 10,003. 70 Acr .. , Kor• or Lua. 
lr4636 
·. 
: 
llEllTO!S !l1IEEP CO!IPA.'f! 
A Uait..S Partnttahip 
"'·~ m ~artnar 
.. · 
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